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pyong (py) 3.307 sq m or 35.586 sq ft
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KRIHS - Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements
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MOC - Ministry of Construction
MOF - Ministry of Finance
MOHA - Ministry of Home Affairs
NACF - National Agriculture Cooperative Federation
NHCL - National Housing Construction Loan
NHF - National Housing Fund
OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
SIFCs - Short-Term Investment and Finance Companies
WAFD - Worker's Asset Formation Deposit
/a In this report "$" refers to US dollars.
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1. Over the past 20 years, the Korean population has experienced a
twenty-fold increase in incomes, and the prospects for continued economic
growth are good. As per capita GNP grew from less than $100 in 1960 to
$2,000 today, Korea was transformed from a rural society, where only 382 lived
in cities, to the most urbanized country in East Asia with 71% in cities
today. Atthough the rate of urbanization has slowed, rapid househo d forma-
tion will continue because of the young age structure of the Korean popula-
tion. The combination of growing incomes and high rates of household forma-
tion in the context of extremely crowded housing conditions will produce
continued strong demand for urban services, especially housing. Despite
significant improvements in recent years in the quality and average size of
housing units, the relative and absolute short4ge of units is acute and
growing worse. The housing finance system which was unable to serve a signi-
ficant proportion of home buyers in the past will be even more inadequate in
the future.
2. As part of the redirection of Government's economic management
strategy toward a more indirect, regulatory role, Korea has undertaken to
liberalize the financial system which is widely considered to be inadequate to
serve the country's large and diversified economy. In addition to the
scarcity of land for urban development, largely a function of geography, the
shortage of finance is an acknowledged bottleneck in the housing sector.
Although the institutions providing housing finance have been operated on a
sound basis, the still low level of financial intermediation in the housing
sector limits the ability of the present system to respond to the changing
economic environment. The purpose of this study is to describe the housing
finance system in Korea, identify its problems and to suggest measures which
should be taken to assure its continued viability and to enhance its contribu-
tion to the development of housing and the economy.
The Housing Finance System in Korea
3. The formal housing finance system is underdeveloped compared to the
size of the Korean housing market, that of the entire financial system and the
potential demand for financial services. Since the creation of the system in
1967, only about 7% of the value of all new houses, or about 15% of the number
of units constructed, were financed by mortgage loans. Although the total
system has expanded rapidly, making loans for 22Z of the value, or 70% of the
number of new units in 1983, the average loan covered only about one-third of
the value of the unit purchased. Furthermore, when transactions involving
existing units are included in this calculation, less than 10% of the value of
housing sold in 1983 was financed from the formal system.
4. The balance of funds required for purchasing housing is financed
from personal savings, gifts, informal borrowing (including the curb market),
and the sale of a former home or other assets. Both the costs of informal
loans and the opportunity cost of using one's own funds have been considerably
higher than the interest rate carried by a formal housing loan.
5. The formal housing finance system is compeded of two principal
publicly-owned institutions, the Korea Housing Bar.k (KYlB) and the National
Housing Fund (NHF), which together provided 88% of all housing loans made in
the past four years. The KhB was established in 1967 to increase the amount
of housing financing available and to improve access to ownership for
first-time buyers. The NHF was established in 1981 as a separate entity,
although it had existed previously as an account within KHB. Although its
general mandate overlaps with that of KHB, the NHF was created to specifically
assist lower-income households to become owners and it was to rely primarily
upon government sources rather than deposits for its funding.
6. Mobilization of resources by the two institutions is markedly diffe-
rent. The KHB raises 95Z of its resources from voluntary deposits by house-
holds. The NHF receives approximately 75% of its resources through tax-like
instruments earmarked for housing lending. The majority of these are
compulsory-purchase bonds with long maturities and very low interest rates.
The NHF also raises about 15% of its resources from deposits made by house-
holds who join contractual saving schemes to increase their chances of obtain-
ing a housing loan.
7. At present, KHB's and NHF's lending activities are very similar
despite the different focus assigned to each. They provide almost identical
loans for units of the same approximate size and value. Over 90% of mortgages
advanced by both institutions are for twenty years and were at the same rate
of interest, 10.0%, from 1982 to 1984 when KHB's was raised to 11.4Z. Both
institutions give priority to first-time buyers and favor new over existing
units, although KHB finances a limited number of used units up to five years
old. The maximum size of eligible unit is similar for NHF and KHB and the
actual distribution of sizes of units financed is almost identical. Since
neither institution has income criteria for eligibility nor verifies the
income of borrowers, it is not possible to directly assess the income groups
being served. However, a 1982 sample survey of KHB borrowers indicates a
middle- to upper-income clientele, which may also be true for NHF, since the
size and type of units are similar. Knowing more about this question is
essential to future policy-making. The rHB, NHF and the activities of other
institutions making mortgage loans are examined in detail in Chapter IV of
this report.
Constraints on the Housing Finance System
8. Mortgage lending has remained small largely because of factors
external to the housing finance system. In the broader context, Government
policies favoring administered interest rates and directed credit have
restrained the growth of the regulated financial system. An undifferentiated
term structure of interest rates has been unfavorable to a long-term lending
institution like KHB, which could not compete for savings on a price basis
because its deposit rates were kept identical to those of other banks and
which could not charge more for its long-term loans. In addition, much
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domestic credit has been directed to specific priority sectors, as defined by
government, with only a small portion permitted to flow to housing.
9. The small supply of formal housing finance has resulted in: (a) a
reduced output of housing, (b) a production bias toward larger units and
wealthier home buyers, and (c) a higher total cost of housing finance for most
buyers. Since housing has been essentially cash-financed in Korea, the number
of households who could afford to buy has been smaller than it would have been
had long-term financing been available. The shortage of financing also biased
the housing market in favor of wealthier and older clients with substantial
accumulated savings. These buyers preferred, and were able to afford, larger
units than would have been built had financing been more widely available.
This system has forced most buyers to rely, to some extent, on more expensive
informal sources of financing. The shortage of mortgages has also led to
creative and complex strategies for financing housing, such as the widespread
practice of renting out rooms in return for large "chonsei" deposits from the
tenants ("loans" to the landlord during the rental period). The very high
rate of household mobility observed in Korea has facilit.ted access to housing
despite the lack of formal financing. However, the practice of trading-up of
houding in small increments untiL the desired size unit is obtained is predi-
cated on rising prices. If housing prices stabilize, there may be more demand
for housing loans as owners are less able to cash in their equity and move up
one more step.
l0. The chronic shortage of mortgage funds, in the context of controlled
interest rates, has required other allocative measures to be employed. The
specific measures chosen have had an important impact on the housing sector.
In an effort to spread the available funds widely, the actual loan-to-value
ratios are about one-third of the purchase price. This has made it difficult
for new middle-income buyers, unable to raise funds for the balance of the
purchase price, to enter the housing market. The number of lower-income
buyers has been further reduced by the practice of lending almost exclusively
for new ,nits when lower-income buyers may only be abLe to afford older, less
expensive dwellings. This practice has probably contributed to accelerating
the depreciation of the older stock. One positive measure, in terms of
resource mobilization for the system, is the priority given in the various
savings schemes to those who have saved for a long time and who have accumu-
lated more savings.
ii. In an environment of fully regulated formal interest rates, KHB has
used a variety of non-price incentives to mobilize resources. First, it has
developed an extensive branch network (149 branches in 1984) to take advantage
of the fact that it is the only bank besides Citizens National Bank (CNB;
directly serving the household sector. In addition, the requirement that the
buyer of a controlled-price unit subscribe to an NHF or KHB savings scheme has
provided a significant non-price incentive for savers. Finally, KHB has also
been able to attract considerable deposits through its only market-priced
savings scheme, which gives savers a large interest subsidy from the Govern-
ment that more than doubles the return over the actual interest paid by KHB.
These various schemes and the outlook for the future are discussed in detail
in Chapter IV.
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12. The contrasting roles, within overlapping mandates, given to KHB and
NHF recognize the need to differentiate policies and even institutions on the
basis of the income groups to be served. However, in practice, the programs
do not appear to have succeeded in reaching a different clientele. This
report supports the basic division of responsibilities, as assigned by the
Government, and suggests some specific policies and procedures which will
allow the market-based system to expand in response to buyers' ability end
willingness to pay for housing finance. At the same time, it is possible to
increase the likelihood that social housing programs reach their intended
beneficiaries by limiting NHF operations to the original mandate of providing
finance to lower-income households.
Rationale for Changes in the Housing Finance System
13. Changes or improvements in the housing finance system are needed
because of: (a) the expected impact of the ongoing financial liberalization,
(b) the weak record of the system in stimulating the housing secLor and
(c) the opportunity for financial reform to develop more effective public
policy tools in the housing sector. In recent years, the profitability of KHB
has been very weak because of interest rate controls, and the process of
liberalizing the financial sector could make the situation worse. In fact,
the increase in interest rates to 12% for deposits over six months, introduced
in April 1985, leaves KHB's marginal cost of funds higher than its lending
rate -- clearLy an untenable position if KHB is to expand. Increasing compe-
tition in the financial sector will raise tIe efficiency of financial inter-
mediation, which can be extended to housing finance if KHB is free to charge
sufficiently high interest rates on its loans to cover the costs of competi-
tively mobilizing funds. Mortgages priced closer to the market will also
reinforce the integration of financial markets and reduce interest in real
estate by investors whose primary motive is to obtain a subsidized loan. The
growth of the formal housing finance system is also inextricably linked with
another financial sector trend - a reduction in the size of the curb market.
The financial institutions serving the housing sector are in the best position
to attract new household deposits. A smaller curb market will also affect the
demand for KHB funds as borrowers turn to other sources of finance for home
purchase.
14. The Government's shift in economic management strategy, in general,
and the movement toward liberalization of the financial system, in particular,
can be extended to housing finance with a high pay-off. The still small size
of the housing finance system relative to the level of investment in the
sector means that the allocative efficiency and reduced transaction costs
which flow from a modern financial system could benefit housiAg to a much
greater extent. Changes in the system would also bring additional buyers into
the market, which is now limited to those able to afford a doun payment of
two-thirds of the value of the unit purchased. Measures to expand the formal
market mortgage system would also allow the Government to reduce the level of
public resources devoted to housing finance. At the same time, a deliberate
and explicit targetting of public resources to lower-income families would
probably increase the benefits to this group by reducing leakages to those who
can afford to pay market terms. In the past, the value of NHF mortgages to
the lower-income groups was limited because the loans were small and the terms
undifferentiated from all other borrowers.
15. Reform of the housing finance system offers an opportunity for the
Government to improve the performance of the housing sector. At a general
level, the effectiveness of public expenditure should be increased by
distinguishing more clearly between efficiency and equity goals in housing
policy and focussing direct public spending on the latter. The controls and
rationing devices required for a subsidized program would become unnecessary
and cost savings should be possible. It is likely that somewhat more
resources would flow to the housing sector as a result of expanding the
unsubsidized mortgage system without any increase in public expenditures. By
providing more market-priced housing finance to middle-income buyers, the
output of new units should be less skewed to the larger sizes favored by
upper-income households. For the social programs, the better terms offered
for the smallest units, along with a reduced maximum eligible size, will also
contribute to the more efficient use of resources in the sector. An expanded
financing system may also act to stabilize demand compared to the present
"cash" system, since the decision to buy will not be so dependent on upper-
income savings, market fluctuations in asset values or other residual events.
Proposed Directions
16. Housing finance is not only a portion of the overall financial
system but must function in an environment which is also shaped by housing
policies. The foundations for the present housing policy in Korea were estab-
lished almost fifteen years ago when conditions in the economy, in finance and
in the housing sector were considerably different from what they are today.
It is therefore time for a systematic review of policies and institutional
arrangements in the sector. Output of new houses in recent times has fallen
considerably short of both Government targets and the growth in urban
households. Therefore, an increase in the output of new units is essential
for any quantitative improvement in housing conditions. Toward this end, the
Government should review the rationale for and the extent of direct public
sector involvement in housing production. It may help to clearly differen-
tiate the role of public sector agencies from their private sector counter-
parts. In particular, sector policies should be examined for any disincen-
tives which may be constraining the full participation and normal activities
of the private sector. This report suggests that eliminating the present
price controls on privately developed apartments is an example of how sector
performance might be improved.
17. Before the recommendations of this study can be implemented, it is
necessary that the policymakers clarify the role of the Government in the
housing sector in general and the housing finance system in particular.
Housing policies should be cast in a broader framework than in the past to
take into account: (a) policy objectives other than ownership; (b) existing
units as an important source of lower-cost housing; (c) upgrading and
renovation as an economically efficient way to improve housing conditions; and
(d) the varied needs of different income groups.
18. The current separation of the housing finan-e institution for lower-
income buyers, NHF, from the KHB should be maintained as it provides an oppor-
tunity to assign distinct objectives to each institution. As the market
system expands to provide financing to most Koreans, NHF's clientele should be
-vi -
restricted to assure that public assistance is going to the beneficiaries
designated by the Government. An upper limit of the 50th percentile of the
urban income distribution is suggested at this time.
19. The type of mortgages offered by NHF should also reflect the policy
objective of serving lower-income households. If the interest rate on NHF's
adjustable mortgages is set, as recommended, at a level which covers the
financial cost of funds as a minimum, it is likely that NHF will be able to
lend at lower rates than other institutions because of its below-market
sources of funds. It is also recommended that the bias in favor of financing
small units be increased by establishing a maximum size equal to the average
of the national stock, which presently is about 20 py, as opposed to the
cu.rent maximum of 25.7 py, and that the loan-to-value ratio be "tapered" so
that buyers of smaller units can obtain relatively larger loans, if they wish,
thus reducing the need for large down payments. In addition to the present
practice of lending through public sector builders for new houses, NHF should
offer loans for existing dwellings and for new privately developed units which
meet the physical criteria set for new units as a way to increase the pool of
available housing for lower-income iouseholds.
20. The main sources of funding presently used for NHF are appropriate
and not likely to change quickly, save one. Type II Housing Bonds (see
para. 2.29) which are related to the sale of controlled-price apartments will
not serve any purpose if the recommendation to eliminate such controls is
adopted. If the market-based system is allowed to expand, the overall program
proposed can be carried out without major new sources of revenue for NHF.
21. T!e fundamental question for the market housing finance system is
whether to attempt to sustain a segregated system or whether to integrate
housing finance within a liberalized financial sector. The latter course is
recommended because it can bring important efficiency gains to the entire
economy and to the housing sector, and because it will enable the institutions
to be more responsive to the quantity and type of finance wanted by home
buyers. Integration, first of all, implies that interest rates for housing
finance be deregulated along with the rest of the financial system. The
recent increase in deposit rates, without a corresponding increase fcr
lending, is untenable from KHB's point of view. Thus, it is suggested that
KHB be allowed to price its loans at the maximum of the interest rate band
during a transition period. Since one of the main objectives of reforming the
housing finance system is to allow the system to respond to the demand for
moro and larger mortgages, even charging the maximum regulated rates during
the transition period will result in the system being able to hold its present
share of savings, and perhaps even increase it, if household savings rise as
projected by economic planners. If the type of integration for housing
finance proposed in this report were adopted, the market for mortgages should
be profitable enough to attract other lenders, including the commercial
banks. Although their share is very small, one commercial bank, one credit
union and several insurance companies and pension funds are already providing
mortgage loans. However, their participation is likely to remain small unless
there is some facility for financial institutions to adjust the maturity of
their assets such as a secondary market for long-term mortgages. Although
this is not an urgent matter in Korea so long as KHB is the major lender, it
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would be desirable to initiate preparations because it will take some time to
resolve the technical issues.
22. If KHB is to have the volume of funds necessary to make a larger
impact on the housing sector, it will need to pay careful attention to its
mobilization programs during the transition period. Higher deposit rates will
be the key to mobilization, but other traditional programs, such as the
contractual saving schemes, will remain important as long as interest rates
are not the sole rationing mechanism in the financial system. For future
expansion, KHB should explore some non-deposit sources such as issuing bonds
to institutional investors. If these are offered at mar:-.et rates, they could
be as significant a source of funds for housing finance as they have become in
other integrated financial systems. Analysis indicates that the demand for
mortgages will not be explosive, instead it is expected to be a multiple of
two to about four times the present size over the next five years, a growth
not greatly superior to that of the entire financial system. Allowing market
forces to play an increasing role in setting the price .or mortgages will act
as an automatic restraint on exccssive shifts of financial resources to this
sector.
23. The KHB and its customers could also benefit from changes to the
single mortgage instrument now being used. First, for households with enough
debt-carrying capacity, higher loan-to-value ratios should be offered at
prices which reflect the inherent risk associated with them. Since the exist-
ing loans are adjustable rate mortgages, that feature should be fully exer-
cised with as little time lag as possible, and the instrument should indicate
to the borrower the basis for adjustment and any limitations there may be,
such as maximum allowable change within a one year period. KHB should lend
for houses of all ages for the same reasons mentioned for NHF and should
offer, as options, a number of features proposed in this report.
The Impact of the Proposed Changes
24. The impact of implementing the recommendations of this study would
be to expand the role and the size of the formal housing finance system in the
housing sector, to fund a broader range of investments in housing and to tar-
get services more effectively to an increasingly differentiated clientele.
The expanded size of the mortgage finance system will be necessary to compen-
sate for an expected decline in informal sources, due to financial sector
reform, and will be facilitated by the application of market pricing to mort-
gage loans. When the housing finance system offers more flexibility in the
types of loans, and an increase in the range of investments eligible for
mortgage financing, the impact of the financing system on the improvement in
housing conditions would be much greater than at present. The availability of
l&rger loans requiring lower down payments and the new features mentioned
above should also enable a greater proportion of medium- and low-income
borrowers to be served by the housing finance system.
25. Since the market side of housing finance is expected to expand, KHB
will need to play the leading role in the medium-term. There are risks in
expanding both the instruments and the activities financed by KHB at the same
time. However, if KHB is free to take decisions on mobilization and lending
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in response to the demand for mortgage finance, it will assure the continued
growth and financial viability of the institution. A clear and unambiguous
goal to expand market-based financing for housing, assigned to KHB, will lead
to better designed mortgage instruments and improved market efficiency.
26. The NHF's effectiveness would be increased by having a more focussed
mandate. Its management would be able to serve a well-defined and verifiable
clientele. To some borrowers, NHF should be able to provide greater assis-
tance than in the past in the form of larger loans and relatively lower rates
than those for KHB mortgages. The major implication for NHF would be to
increase its impact on lower-income groups and small-unit production without
any increase in the total voLume of funds needed and loaned by the
institution.
27. From the viewpoint of home buyers, there will be an increased
availability of formal household finance, which will result in a lower average
cost of borrowing for those households presently relying, to some extent, on
informal markets for finance, where interest rates are typically higher and
maturities much shorter. More flexibility in the type and purpose of loans
available would also mean that more households can improve their housing
situation through the formal financing system. If, as expected, "chonsei"
dezlines, renters will also have the opportunity ti make better use of their
savings and have more alternatives in their choice of rental accommodation.
28. The proposed changes to the housing finance system are consistent
with the Government's objectives to strengthen the nontraded sectors as a
"second engine of growth" and to bring the benefits of more efficient
financial intermediation to more of the economy by liberalizing the financial
system. These benefits would be primarily realized by more of the financing
for housing flowing through the formal system rather than through the informal
credit markets, with lower overall intermediation costs compared to a system
of transactions among private parties. The current volume of the informal
financial claims related to housing suggests an ample opportunity to channel
these resources through the formal system without displacing funds from other
sectors. The demand for mortgage finance will undoubtedly increase, but the
rate of growth will be automatically rescraine4 by the rising price required
to mobilize resources from savers. At the same time, improved allocation of
savings between sectors and a shift in the household savings portfolio toward
more financial instruments are expected. Expanded formal financing would also




PART ONE: OVERVIEW AND IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS IN THE
HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 This study is about the housing finance system in Korea, how it has
worked, the problems it faces and what measures should be taken to assure that
it makes a strong positive cLntribution to Korea's development in the
future. The "housing finance system" refers to the network of financial
institutions which provide loans to households for house purchase or improve-
ment. Korea's rising incomes, expanding domestic markets and high urbaniza-
tion levels are responsible for the increased role of the housing sector and
its financing in z- -:n-1 economic management. A review of the housing
finance system at this time has been prompted by the Korean Government's
adoption of a more decentralized economic management strategy and, in
particular, by the ongoing efforts begun in the early 1980s to "liberalize"
the financial system, which includes the housing finance system.
1.02 The financial liberalization in progress has two aims: first, to
stimulate private savings by providing better financial savings vehicles than
in earlier years, and second, to improve the efficiency of investment so as to
generate more growth with the same savings level, which implies more dynamic,
better informed, and better integrated financial markets. Liberalization in
this context includes the progressive decontrol of interest rates, the priva-
tization of all deposit banks (excluding for the moment the specialized banks,
such as Citizens National Bank and Korea Housing Bank), an increased role for
foreign banks, and the deregulation of the banking system by progressive
elimination of detailed government intervention into daily banking opera-
tions. This movement also includes the encouragement of innovations in bank-
ing management together with the development of accounting, credit evaluation,
and financial service firms, which are crucial to the growth and efficiency of
financial market operations. Banking liberalization in deposit mobilization
as well as in lending operations raises important questions for the housing
finance system which has so far been highly specialized, closely regulated and
kept rather isolated from other banking activities.
1.03 The foundations of Korea's housing policies date to the early
1970s. The Korean economy, the structure of society, and, not surprisingly,
the housing markets have all changed substantially since that time. The
problems associated with building an industrial economy, including start-up of
new industries and development of basic infrastructure, have been faced and
successfully tackled in Korea. At the present stage of development, the
Government has been rethinking its role in the economy and is moving away from
direct intervention toward a more indirect regulatory posture. Specif,cally,
questions are being raised about the effectiveness of direct government
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intervention in sectors such as housing. Many of the ongoing reforms, such as
that of the financial system, will have a major impact on the housing market.
The gradual evolution of the role of Government to "rule maker" rather than
active "player" in the economy and the implied greater reliance on market
forces will require adjustments in policies for and in institutions serving
the housing sector.
1.04 This report, which attempts to address these changing attitudes
toward housing and its financing, is organized into two parts comprising seven
chapters. Part One provides an overview of the housing sector and housing
finance system. This part includes, in addition to this introductory chapter,
three chapters which discuss housing conditions and policies in Korea, the
housing finance system and the individual housing finance institutions. Pro-
blems related to the housing finance system are identified and analyzed. Part
Two provides recommendations for reform of the housing finance system in light
of the policy toward financial liberalization currently under way. This sec-
tion includes three chapters which deal with housing policy, the market-based
housing finance system and the financing of housing for lower-income buyers.
II. HOUSING CONDITIONS AND POLICIES
A. Housing Conditions
The Demand for Housing
2.01 Korea now has the largest share of population living in urban areas
among the developing countries in Asia, other than Singapore, and is already
at the urbanization level of many developed nations. As early as 1970 the
rural population growth leveled off and started declining in a,solu U terms.
At present about 70% of the Korean population lives in urban areas,- whereas
only fifteen years ago the share was only about 40%. At present, cities are
growing at about 5.0% p.a., much faster than the 1.6% p.a. rate for the total
population. Korea also has a number of cities which are large by inter-
national standards. Seoul City proper is expected to reach 10 million inhabi-
tants in 1986, Busan about 3.5 million, and three other cities over 1 million.
2.02 The speed with which urbanization occurred and the resulting large
size of Korean cities have both served to exacerbate the housing situation.
Rural housing markets have been in quantitative balance and, in some
instances, have even had surplus dwellings for over a decade. On the other
hand, the cities, especially the larger ones, have experienced extremely tight
markets for all types of housing. The considerably different housing condi-
tions among rural areas, small centers and large cities call for flexible
policies to respond to varying local conditions.
1/ According to Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and Economic Planning Bureau
(EPB) data for 1983, 71.4% of Koreans lived in urban areas of more than
20,000 population and 64.4% lived in areas of more than 50,000
population.
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2.03 The rate of household formation has been, and is expected to
continue to be, far above the rate of population increase (see Table 2.1).
This is due in large part to the young age structure of the Korean population,
where the 452 under 20 years of age are forming new smaller households in
large numbers. Table 2.1 shows that the average increase in households
between 1980-85 has been about 320,000 per year and is expected to increase to
about 360,000 households per year between 1985-90.
Table 2.1: POPULATION, HOUSEHOLDS, AVERAGE
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, 1975-1990
Population Households Average
Year Number Change* Number Change* household size
('000) (Z) ('000) (1'000) (Z)
1975 34,707 - 6,761 - - 5.1
1980 37,936 1.53 7,969 242 3.3 4.7
1985 40,467 1.57 9,575 321 3.7 4.2
1990 43,594 1.50 11,372 359 3.5 3.8
Sources: EPB, Republic of Korea, Population and Housing Census, 1975, 1980,
1985 (prelim.) and mission estimates.
Annual average for preceding five-year period.
2.04 Although the factors which determine the demand for housing
services, such as household formation, personal incomes and household savings,
have all been growing strongly in Korea for the past 20 years, effective
demand for new housing has been dampened by high dwelling prices relative to
incomes and the limited availability of formal housing finance. Most home-
buyers must purchase their dwellings on a cash basis, relying on accumulated
savings and high-cost informal sources of funds. Many families, especially
young urban families in reasonably secure jobs, who could afford to buy if
long-term financing were available, are forced to remain renters. The limited
availability of finance and strong investment opportunities elsewhere in the
economy have also inhibited the development of a healthy rental market,
leaving both renters and the large share of owners, who rent out a portion of
their homes, housed more poorly than might be expected for a country whose
income has been growing as quickly as Korea's. Strong public sentiment that
better housing is needed, along with the expected steady economic growth and
continued urbanization, will place increasing pressure on housing markets in
Korea in the future, which can be relieved, to some extent, by expanding and
improving the housing finance system.
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The Supply of Housing
2.05 Much has been done to improve the supply of housing since the devas-
tation to the housing stock caused by the Korean War. The output of new units
shows a generally upward trend since 1966 (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1),
except for a rather sharp decline in output for three years after 1978.
Housing construction has become a major economic activity, accounting for
about 6% of GNP or about 20% of fixed capital formation in 1984.
Table 2.2: STOCK AND OUTPUT OF NEW DWELLINGS
Existing stock New Investment in Housing
Year of dwellings (a) dwellings (b) GNP GDCF (c)
(units) (units) (Z) (Z)
1966 4,070,000 93,321 1.5 8
1967 4,iO0,000 94,568 1.9 9
1968 4,180,000 96,225 2.3 10
1969 4,280,000 104,545 3.0 10
1970 4,360,000 115,000 2.7 13
1971 4,430,000 130,000 3.4 11
1972 4,490,000 110,000 3.4 10
1973 4,590,000 142,560 2.9 16
1974 4,690,000 158,110 3.4 16
1975 4,734,000 179,951 4.5 17
1976 4,900,000 169,970 3.7 13
1977 5,100,000 203,545 4.4 17
1978 5,240,000 300,107 6.1 19
1979 5,420,000 251,000 4.9 17
1980 5,460,000 211,537 5.3 22
1981 5,580,000 149,837 4.1 18
1982 5,740,000 191,420- 6.6 20
1983 5,896,000 225,990 5.2 23
1984 6,085,000 222,081 5.9 20
1985 6,274,000 227,000 n.a. n.a.
Sources: (a) EPB, Republic of Korea, Population and Housirg Census, 1970,
1975, 1980, 1985 (prelim.)
(b) KHB, Housing Finance Bi-Monthly Review, April 1985.
(c) Gross Domestic Capital Formation (at current prices).
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2.06 During the period 1970-80, the actual per capita consumption of
housing services rose markedly, an2,there was a significant increase in the
actual space availq3le per person.- In 1970, the average size unit in the
stock was 13.8 py,- yielding an average living space of 2.1 py per person.
By 1975, the average had increased to 17.5 py and 2.4 py per person. At the
time of the census in 1980, the average unit was 20.7 py with 2.9 py per
person, a 40X increase in space per pepon in only ten years (see
Tabie 2.3). A more detailed analysis - undertaken for the Fifth Five-Year
Plan (1982-86) identified that the increase in average house size has been
partly due to the construction of larger size units in recent years and also
to the renovation and upgrading of existing units, which have made a major
contribution to increasing the residential floor space available. The
upgrading of the existing stock, accounting for only about 20-25Z of the
investment made in new housing, contributed half as much new floor space as
did the construction of new dwellings during the period 1970-75.
2.07 More space has not been the only improvement in Korean housing
conditions since the Korean War - by all standards the quality of housing has
been steadily improving as well. In contrast to many other countries, the
climate of Korea forces buyers to choose higher quality housing in the form of
solid, weather-tight structures. Service standards are also high -- in 1980
83% of urban houses were served by piped water, 1002 by electricity and 57% by
telephones.
2/ Detailed analyses of Korean housing surveys have shown that in the late
1970s there was a greater preference for larger residential space over
sole occupancy of a unit. Households with increased incomes were more
likely to purchase or rent larger space than they were to search for a
unit that they could occupy alone. These studies also show that the
demand for more space is very sensitive to housing prices in Korea. The
lack of mortgage financing has been one of the factors influencing the
housing strategy followed by Korean households. See Follain, Lim and
Renaud "The Economics of Residential Crowding in Developing Countries,"
Journal of Urban Economics (1984) as well as "Housing Crowding in Devel-
oping Countries and Willingness to Pay for Additional Space, the Case of
Korea," Journal of Development Economics (1982).
3/ Pyong (py) is a Korean measure of area equivalent to 3.307 m2.
4/ Raymond J. Struyk, Housing in Korea's Fifth Five-Year Plan:
Possibilities and Constraints, The Urban Institute (1980).
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Table 2.3: SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSINC STOCK (Z)
Unit size (py) 1970 1975 1980
Less than 10 32.7 19.6 10.8
10 to 19 51.1 54.1 51.0
20 to 29 12.0 18.4 25.4
30 to 39 2.6 4.7 6.9
More thait 40 1.5 3.2 5.9
100.0 100.0 100.0
Average size (py) 13.8 17.5 20.7
Source: EPB, Population and Housing Census, 1970, 1975, 1980.
2.08 In spite of these significant achievements, the average annual
output has not managed to keep pace with the growth of new households. To
illustrate, during the period 1980-85, the average annual output of about
200,000 new units fell significantly short of the average annual growth of new
households estimated at about 320,000 per year. This situation appears even
more difficult when demolitions of existing houses, which have averaged about
one-third of new housing production over the same period, are considered,
making the net addition to the housing stock less than one-half the number of
new households. The inability of output to keep up with household formation
has created a severe housing shortage. In other countries with milder
climates, this situation would be expected to result in a proliferation of
inadequately serviced slums and squatter areas. In Korea, however, where the
harsh winter climate forces households to live in better quality housing, the
housing shortage has led to extreme crowding in urban areas. Of a number of
densely populated countries sampled, Korea has among the most crowded condi-
tions, (see Table 2.4). The situation has continued to deteriorate from an
average of 1.3 households per dwelling nationwide in 1970 to over 1.5 house-
holde per dwelling in 1980. Crowding is much worse in the rapidly growing
urban areas than these nationwide figures would suggest, with Seoul averaging
more than two households per dwelling. According to the latest census in
1980, only 30% of urban households occupied an entire unit, while 30% shared
with one other family, 18% with two and 22Z with three or more other house-
holds in a single unit. Homeowners also share their houses with renters in
order to help finance the costs of ownership. The crowding conditions have
severely affected the lower-income families, many of whom live in only one
room.
2.09 A measure of the relative level of output of new units in Korea,
compared to other countries which already have mature housing markets, is
captured in the building rate (see Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2). On average,
Korea produced 5.37 new units per thousand population between 1979 and 1983
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which would rank it below many developed countries which already have compar-
able numbers of units and households. Also significant is the fact that
despite a relatively high share of GNP going to housing in recent years, the
number of units built has remained small as the average value grew quickly,
especially of privately developed units (see Figure 2.3). This trend toward
larger and higher-priced units is directly related to the nature of the
housing finance system. The present system discriminates in favor of those
who have their wealth in a form that can be used to make the required large
down payment. Many families, who will be home buyers later in life, are
denied the opportunity to borrow against their future income because the
present financing system is so restricted. An expanded system would mean that
households with presently lower incomes could enter the market. Although
there is no direct measure of the supply elasticity of housing in Korea,
economic analyses in other countries show a relatively inelastic response in
the short-term but a high supply elasticity in the longer run. Policy objec-
tives and instruments are often based on a time horizon which is too short to
sustain long-term growth in the housing sector.
Table 2.4: MEASURES OF CROWDING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Households Percent with 3 Housing
1976 GNP per per dwell- Persons or more data
capita in US$ ing unit per room persons/room year
India 150 1.038 2.8 n.a. 1971
Pakistan 170 1.060 3.1 59.0 1960
Indonesia 240 1.019 1.6 24.2 1971
Egypt 280 1.215 1.6 15.5 1960
Thailand 380 1.010 n.a. n.a. 1970
Philippines 410 n.a. n.a. 30.1 1967
Morocco 540 1.264 2.1 34.4 1971
Colombia 630 1.410 n.a. n.a. 1964
Turkey 791 n.a. 2.0 29.2 1965
Mexico 1,090 1.000 2.2 n.a. 1970
Brazil 1,140 1.062 1.0 4.9 1970
Korea, Rep. 1,606 1.329 2.0 26.8 1970
Poland 2,860 1.196 1.3 n.a. 1970
UK 4,020 1.048 0.6 0.1 1971
France 6,550 1.062 0.7 n.a. 1968
Japan 6,910 1.011 1.1 3.9 1968
Germany 7,380 1.062 0.7 n.a. 1972
US 7,890 1.000 0.6 0. 1970
Sources: United Nations, Human Settlements, Statistical Appendix, 1977;
EPB, Republic of Korea, Population and Housing Census, 1970.
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Table 2.5: BUILDING RATES IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES


















Source: OECD, Comparative Housing Position in the Industrialized Countries,
1982.
2.10 The most widely quoted measure of housing conditions in Korea is the
"supply ratio," which compares the number of households to the number of
dwellings. While the available measures of space per person have been
increasing the supply ratio has declined rather significantly since the
mid-1960s (Table 2.6). However, this aggregate measure of housing conditions
does not show a complete picture because each unit is treated identically and
no distribution of units among households is presented. In fact, the rigid
system of building standards and zoning regulations may have made the situa-
tion seem worse by having units, which are built for and used by more than one
household, counted as a single house in the Census. Changes to these regula-
tions in late 1984 may, over time, bring about a recalculation of the supply
ratio making it more consistent with other housing indicators. Although the
decline in the supply ratio should not be used as the sole or even the princi-
pal measure of the housing problem, as it has tended to be in o'ficial plans,
it is indicative of the trend toward even greater sharing of units.
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Table 2.6: THE SUPPLY RATIO
Year Households Dwellings Supply ratio
(A) (B) (B t A)
1966 4,812,000 4,070,000 0.85
1970 5,793,000 4,360,000 0.74
1975 6,702,000 4,734,000 0.71
1980 7,849,000 5,460,000 0.69
1985 9,575,000 6,274,000 0.66
Source: EPB, Republic of Korea, Population and Housing Census, 1970, 1975,
1980, 1985 (prelim.).
2.11 In Korea, the term "public sector" refers to housing developed by
the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) or local governments but built
by private contractors. Almost all public housing is sold to individual
owners with hardly any rented. Public sector institutions originally became
involved in housing supply to introduce sizes (smaller) and types (apartments)
not being provided by the private sector. From this initial limited role, the
public sector has become a major supplier of new units, especially smaller and
less expensive ones, actually exceeding the output of the private sector in
three of the last five years. In contrast, the annual production of private
sector housing has been more or less constant since the early 1970s (see Table
2.7). This relative shift toward the public sector has proceeded despite
Covernment policy statements in favor of promoting a healthy and growing
private sector housing industry. In part, the shift has occurred because
government agencies are less affected by changes in the overall economic
environment, and, more importantly because the private sector faces a number
of constraints which have limited its ability to profitably compete with the
public sector. Most obvious among these are administrative controls on the
prices of the most popular types of new units, more difficult access to
serviced land, different tax treatment than for the public sector on land
acquisition, construction activities and buyers costs, and the much more
limited formal financing available for privately developed housing. With a
view to increasing the efficiency of supplying housing, it seems appropriate
for the Government to review the entire range of housing sector policies to
eliminate any unintended discriminatory effects which may be restraining
private sector output.
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Table 2.7: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SHARES IN NEW
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
(numbers of units)
Year Public (X) Private (Z) Total
1965 7,953 (11) 62,512 (89) 70,465
1970 12,382 (11) 102,618 (89) 115,000
1975 62,700 (35) 117,251 (65) 179,951
1980 106,187 (50) 105,350 (50) 211,537
1981 77,633 (52) 72,204 (48) 149,837
1982 68,209 (36) 123,211 (64) 191,420
1983 82,071 (36) 143,919 (64) 225,990
1984 114,081 (51) 108,000 (49) 222,081
1985 132,000 (58) 95,000 (42) 227,000
Source: KHB, Housing Finance Bi-monthly Review, April 1985,
updated by MOC for 1985.
Household Mobility
2.12 In most nations the number of new units built and sold is small
compared to the housing stock and to the number of existing units traded
during a year. The volume of housing transactions relative to new unit sales
is probably even greater in Korea because of the high mobility reported.
According to a recent Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS)
study, Koreans are very mobile, with owner-occupiers spending an average of
only 3.7 years in a single dwelling. This compares with about six years in
the USA, alm?7 t ten years in most of Western Europe and 17 years in the
Philippines.- For Korea this implies that, on average, 152 of the stock of
housing changes ownership each year, which is about four times the number of
new units constructed. Much of this movement is within the same city rather
than from rural to urban areas. For the group of larger cities, 91% of the
moves are within the same city.
2.13 According to the 1982 KRIHS survey, the motive for moving is clearly
to improve one's housing conditions as opposed to employment relocation, for
example. There appears to be a small share of lateral moves (about 30%),
which is a very specific feature of the Korean market not common elsewhere.
Improvements in housing status include moving to larger premises, with more
facilities and better neighborhood amenities, and also in moving to more
secure tenure forms. The high rate of mobility observed in Korea has facili-
tated access to housing, despite the shortage of formal financing, by allowing
5I For renters in Korea, the average time spent in a dwelling varies from
one year eight months to two years one month.
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people to build up equity by buying and selling units in those parts of the
housing market where prices were escalating. However, the practice of
trading-up of housing in small increments until the desired size unit is
obtained is predicated on rising prices. If housing prices stabilize, there
may be more demand for housing loans as owners are less able to cash in their
equity and move up one more step.
Housing Prices and Access to Ownership
2.14 Not surprisingly, given the crowded conditions and relatively low
output of new units in Korea, upward pressure on prices has been strong.
Although there are problems with the comparability of data from different
periods, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) has prepared a price series for
housing for the period 1965 through 1980 including comparisons with urban
wages and the consumer price index (CPI) (see Table 2.8). Over this entire
period, the statistics show housing rising about 2.7Z a year faster than urban
wages and twice as fast as the CPI. KRIHS has prepared a more disaggregated
analysis of housing prices for the period 1976-82, which shows how housing
prices have increased relative to different income levels. Even though
incomes rose significantly in the 1976-82 period, the cost of housing has been
rising at a faster rate for households below the 50th percentile of the income
distribution. Therefore, access to ownership has become more difficult for
the lower-income families. Despite the ye/cent slowdown in the rise of housing
prices and lower nominal interest rates,- a house purchase is still out of
reach for most low- and middle-income families until relatively late in life.
Table 2.8: CHANGES IN HOUSINC PRICES AND INCOMES, 1965-1980
(1965 = 100)
Year Housing prices Urban wages CPI
1965 100 100 100
1970 379 339 178
1975 1,108 763 364
1980 3,936 2,84? 805
Average 1965-80
Percent per year 27.7% 25.0Z 14.9Z
Source: HOC.
6/ House prices leveled off in 1981 and 1982, and interest rates on housing
loans decreased from a maximum of 19.5Z in 1980 to 1OZ in 1983.
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2.15 Based on a KHB survey, the average age of household heads who
received housing loans was about 39 years, attributable in large part to the
long period of time required to accumulate the amount of wealth needed for a
down payment. The relatively high mean age of borrowers has important finan-
cial implications for both the borrower and the lender. In Korea, a signifi-
cant proportion of workers presently retire before their mid-50s. Thus KHB
borrowers who received a 20-year housing loan have borrowed at the upper end
of their working life, and repayments will be required into their retirement
years. Improvements in the availability of housing finance would permit
ownership sooner for most households.
2.16 Although various surveys have found the Korean preference for home
ownership to be very strong, the portion of Korean households nationwide who
are owner-occupants has been falling from more than 80% in the 1960s to about
60% in 1980. In the cities only 45% are owner-occupants and one-third of
those (i.e., 15% of all households) rent out part of their units to other
families. Thus, in urban areas about 55% of households are renters, and an
additional 152 are landlordz with tenants in the same house where they live.
The proportion of urban dwellers in Korea who are renters is now over one-half
and is not likely to decline for the foreseeable future, in part due to the
financial difficulty associated with puirchasing because of the large cash down
payments and limited availability of housing finance.
Affordability Indicators
2.17 It is possible to ex&-nine the "affordability" of housing in Korea
using official income data, prevailing housing prices, formal and informal
interest rates and assuming that 25% to 30% of incomes are devoted to hous-
ing. The results can be expressed as the number of py of floor space that a
household of a particular income level could purchase under the given prices
and financing terms (see Table 2.9).
2.18 In Table 2.9, Example 1 represents what the typical borrower from a
"social housing" lender can buy. It assumes a 50Z loan and a costless down
payment of 50Z to purchase a unit at the controlled price of Won 1.08 million
per py. The smallest public unit constructed in 1984 was 13 py which, under
this scenario, could be purchased by a household at about the 20th percentile
of the urban income distribution. Of course, most poor households would have
trouble assembling a 50% down payment cost free, and Example 2 shows what
happens if they must borrow 20% of the housing price in the informal credit
markets. The minimum size unit becomes affordable only at about the 54th per-
centile, and an average size unit of 20 py only at about the 80th percentile.
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Table 2.9: AFFORDABILITY OF KOREAN HOUSING
Ezample 1 2 3 4 5 6
Formal borrowing 50Z 50% 35Z 35% 35Z 0Z
Informal borrowing 0% 20% 0% 15Z 25Z 40%
Savings 50% 30Z 65% 50S 40Z 60%
Total 100% ;00Z 100% 100X 100Z 100Z
Interest of formal loan 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5%
Interest of informal loan 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 22.0% 22.0%
Housing price (mil.won/py) 1.08 1.08 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
Share of income for housing 25% 30X 30% 30% 30% 30%
Affordability - py by
income decile
I 9.4 3.8 11.6 5.8 6.2 2.8
II 11.9 7.4 14.7 7.3 6.6 3.6
III 14.3 8.8 17.6 8.8 7.8 4.3
IV 16.7 10.3 20.6 10.2 9.2 5.0
v 18.8 11.6 23.2 11.6 10.3 5.7
VI 21.3 13.2 26.3 13.1 11.7 6.4
VII 24.8 15.4 30.7 15.3 13.7 7.5
VIII 29.2 18.1 36.1 17.9 16.1 8.8
IX 36.2 22.4 44.7 22.3 19.9 10.9
x 56.6 35.0 69.9 34.8 31.2 17.9
Sources: All data are for end-1984. Maturity of formal loans is taken as the
actual for KHB and NHF, and for informal loans the assumption is a
three-year loan, rolled-over once, for a six-year total term. The
curb market interest rate is based on regular government surveys of
the informal credit mi.rkets as reported to the Bank mission.
2.19 In a similar fashion, Example 3 represents the typical borrower from
a housing finance institution, who receives the average loan for 35Z of the
house value and has saved the remainder. The smallest private unit, about 20
py, becomes "affordable" at the 35th percentile and even a middle income
household at the 50th percentile can buy about 25 py. More realistically, a
borrower might supplement his 35% loan with 15% from informal bcrrowings, as
shown in Example 4, which makes the 20 py private unit affordable at the 79th
percentile, and the largest unit eligible for a loan, 30 py, affordable only
at the 92nd percentile. Examples 5 and 6 show that large borrowings in the
informal markets, whether combined with a formal loan or alone, are only
affordable to the highest income groups.
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2.20 This analysis demonstrates that households near the lower income of
the second quartile can only purchase a new unit if they have very large
savings for the down payment and if there are small units available. In prac-
tice, present financing conditions, which force prospective buyers to resort
to higher cost informal loans, will have the effect of either attracting much
higher income buyers than intended or causing the purchaser to devote a larger
share of income to housing.
Housing as an Investment
2.21 The most powerful motive for Korean households to become owners may
well have been to protect the value of their savings. Housing has consistent-
ly been the best performer when compared to other assets available to house-
holds, such as deposits in financial institutions. The real rate of interest
on bank deposits has only been positive twice between 1972 and 1982, and then
by less than 2.52. Over the same period, housing prices have averaged rates
of increase in excess of the CPI in nine of the last ten years, often by a
margin of 1lo to 20x. This high rate of appreciation of real estate has
caused 4ousehold wealth to increase rapidly in the second half of the
1970..' Since 1982, interest rates have been positive in real terms and
there is evidence that the rise in housing prices has slowed dramatically.
B. Housing Policy
Evolution of Housing Policy
2.22 Housing policy, which is the responsibility of the MOC, has evolved
considerably in the past twenty years. The first deliberate housing policy
can be dated to the establishment of KNHC, a government-owned housing
developer, in 1962 and KHB in 1967. The early emphasis was on direct delivery
of housing services supplied by public sector institutions. These agencies
were established to construct a smaller size and lower priced unit than was
being supplied by private corporations. An element of the plan was to reduce
the cost of these units by having public corporations construct them without
profit. The objectives of these corporations were to stimulate housing,
mainly by direct public sector supply, while improving access of lower income
households by holding down prices and providing long-term housing finance.
2.23 The first fundamental housing plan was established in 1972, during
the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1972-76). That year, the Ten-
Year Long-Term Housing Plan was developed and the Housing Construction Promo-
tion Law enacted (Law No. 2409). These two documents still form the basic
framework for the Korean housing policy, which gives preference to public
housing projects in using government lands and provides the rationale for
public programs to focus on low-income households. The Ten-Year Plan esta-
blished a goal of 2.5 million new units between 1973 and 1982 and proposed a
significantly larger role for Government in the supply and financing of
71 See D. Ortmeyer, "A Macroeconomic Analysis of Domestic Saving Behavior in
Korea," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1980.
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housing. Shortly after the present Government came to power, a Master Plan
for housing was announced (October 1980), which projected ambitious goals for
housing but did not fundamentally alter the policy environment for the
sector. The main goals or targets were scaled back to somewhat more realistic
levels in the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1982-86) issued in 1981.
2.24 Over the years policymakers and the public have focussed their
attention on the quantity of new housing units built. Almost all housing
policy statements in Korea emphasize the objective of "one house per house-
hold" and have made the supply ratio the central test of progress in the
sector. However, achievement of this objective has been consistently frustra-
ted. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81) set a target of 0.80 for the supply
ratio by 1981 but the actual outcome was even below the 0.77 registered at the
beginning of the Plan. The Fifth Five-Year Plan has 0.78 as its target for
1986 but in 1985 the ratio was only 0.66. In urban areas the situation is
much worse. In 1980, the year of the most recent city data, the supply ratio
for all cities was only 0.56, and it is estimated that both Seoul and Busan
have at least twice as many households as dwellings. Although new construc-
tion has fluctuated between 2.7% (1982) and 5.7% (1978) of the existing stock
in recent years, the net growth rate of the entire stock has only averaged
2.2% over the past twenty years. The difference is attributable to the high
number of removals from the stock, which includes dilapidated units as well as
those torn down to make way for new urban infrastructure and other projects.
2.25 Most changes in housing policy have come about much less because of
failure of housing production to meet stated output goals than because of pub-
tic concern over "speculators" and the effect of rapidly risiag prices on
families' expectations about future home ownership. The 50% increase in
prices in one year (1978) had a particularly strong impact on housing
policy. The Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) was created in 1979 to
improve the supply of land, stabilize land prices and reduce investment in
land by business firms. Demand restraint was introduced to deal with "specu-
lators", and indirect measures such as ceilings on the maximum size of units
and more restrictive rules on capital gains taxation were put into place.
Direct intervention in the pricing of new, privately-built condominiums was,
and still is, used because the prices of these popular units were believed to
have a demonstration effect on the overall market. In actuality, these
contro's, as asplied before the introduction of the "bond bidding system"
(para. 2.29), mey have merely created windfalls upon resale for first
owners. In addition, the direct price controls have almost certainly reduced
the output of new units, which conflicts with the Government's supply expan-
sion objectives. For this reason, it is appropriate to consider options to
deal with "speculation" in a manner which does not have a negative effect on
the supply. The two most promising avenues are full taxation of capital gains
and the aggressive promotion of supply expansion.
2.26 Historically, housing policy in Korea has been based more on equity
considerations than on economic efficiency grounds. In order to achieve
social welfare goals, all actions and programs were focused on first-time
buyers in the belief that this would both target the benefits to low-income
households and ensure that the emphasis of public programs was on creating
additional new units. The latter was thought to be particularly important
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because additional units directly affected the main measure of housing condi-
tions, the supply ratio. Initially, the "need" was perceived to be at the
lover end of the housing market, but, confronted with the actual distribution
of effective demand, the public sector agencies ended up serving a middle-
income clientele while private developers have increasingLy moved upscale in
the market.
2.27 Although housing policy is still viewed as a social welfare matter,
there is an increasing interest in examining what is the most appropriate role
for Government in the sector. Commencing with the establishment of the NHF in
1981, the Governmenc has moved to revise the fundAmental framework for housing
policy. It has retained the essential directions of the Fourth Five-Year Plan
while adding special measures for some important market segments. Continuing
actions have been taken in the area of "speculation" focusing mostly on direct
control of prices at the time of initial sale. The rental market has received
more attention than in the past, and the Government has introduced measures to
re-establish some direct public ownership of rental accommodation. In Decem-
ber 1984, building regulations for the private rental market were changed to
permit owners who are renting out part of their unit to add separate entrances
and facilities. Such measures should have a visible impact on the supply
ratio by removing prohibitions to developing multifamily units contained in
building and zoning regulations.
Price Control Policies on New Housing Units
2.28 As mentioned above, the Government directly controls the sales
prices of newly constructed public units and of apartments developed by the
private sector in designat. d areas. For the public sector units, sales prices
of units produced by the Government's principal developer, KNHC, were pre-
viously required to be set at levels which would recover all costs of develop-
ment including land, infrastructure, house construction and overheads but
provide no profit. This pricing principle has been amended since 1977, now
specifying particular unit sales prices by dwelling size, determined at the
time the project is approved rather than based on market conditions at the
time of sale. The effect of this rather rigid pricing policy is that KNHC,
which recently had to lower sales prices below cost for some units in local
markets where it was experiencing difficulty with sales, is not able to price
units in other, more attractive markets at higher prices to offset these
losses, which contributes to a loss of profitability for the agency.
2.29 The sales prices of some new, privately built, condominiums are also
regulated by the Government. In 1983, the "bond-bidding" system was intro-
duced in selected locations, primarily in Seoul. According to this system,
condominium purchasers make an offer to purchase a specific amount of Govern-
ment bonds (called Type II housing bonds) in addition to the payment of the
Government-set condominium price, with the highest bidder receiving the
unit. The stated purpose of issuing bonds is to absorb "speculative profits"
by developers from sales of newly constructed condominiums. This system works
in such a way that thc difference between the controlled price and the bid
price is captured by the Government rather than by the private developers.
Although the introduction of the bond-bidding system is a move toward permit-
ting market prices on newly built units from the purchaser's perspective, the
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Government's control of the price which the developers receive has most
certainly reduced their incentive to produce housing in these areas, which in
turn has contributed to a decline in the supply of new housing for sale.
There is a need to review the desirability of the present pricing policies for
public developers and of direct price controls on newly constructed private
housing.
Interest Rate Policies
2.30 Like all interest rates throughout the formal financial system,
interest rates on housing finance loans and savings deposits have in the past
been fully regulated by the Monetary Board of the Government in consultation
with other government agencies. IntereaL rates established for 20-year loans
for house purchase are presented in Table 2.10 below.
Table 2.10: INTEREST RATES ON HOUSING LOANS
Real interest
Interest rates on CPI rate on housing
Year housing loans (Z) change (Z) loans (Z)
1977 8.0 10.2 -2.2
1978 14.0-16.5 14.5 -0.5-+2.0
1979 14.0-16.5 18.3 -(1.8-4.3)
1980 15.5-19.5 28.7 -(9.2-13.2)
1981 15.0-18.0 21.3 -(3.3-6.3)
1982 10.0-15.0 7.3 +(2.7-7.7)
1983 10.0 3.4 +6.6
1984 11.5 2.3 +9.2
1985 11.5 2.5 +9.0
Sources: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletins; and
MOC data.
Although the Government has frequently adjusted interest rates on new housing
loans, those rates were primarily negative in real terms until 1982 due to the
very high inflation rates experienced over the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Also, for the pe; od 1979-82, the Government established a two-tier system of
interest rates for housing loans with a lover interest rate for smaller house
sizes (15 pyong or less). This was abolished as of June 1982 in favor of a
uniform interest rate for all house sizes. Interest rates on existsng loans
have not been fully adjusted in the upward direction, making the average
spread on the full portfolio even lover.
2.31 In order to be eligible for a housing loan from the two principal
suppliers of housing loans, KHB and NHF, individual households have been
required to enter into contractual savings schemes, whereby they deposit
savings of a particular amount, based on desired house size, on a regular
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basis prior to house purchase. The KHB and NHF contractual savings schemes for
housing loans have paid somewhat lower interest rates than regular savings
deposits in the banking system, which have been negative in real terms until
recently. Because contractual savings deposits are a prerequisite for
establishing eligibility for housing loans, they have in the past provided a
steady and growing source of funds for housing finance, but they may also
create management problems if interest rates are fixed during a period of
declining rates or if new enrollments are insufficient to make the promised
loans when contracts mature. These schemes also provide a record of the
household's savings patterns and may be a good source of information on credit
worthiness in the future.
Rental Housing Policies
2.32 The private sector provides almost all of the rental units available
in the market on an informal basis through the widespread sharing of houses
and apartments by owners. Production of new units for the formal purpose of
rental, which is a negligible portion of the market, has been supplied by the
public sector in the past through KNHC and local governments, with the private
sector involved to a minor extent (see Table 2.11). However, formal "rental"
units produced by KNHC, the principal supplier, are a misnomer, since in the
past these units were provided for rental only on a temporary basis for
periods ranging from one to five years. After this time, the units have been
converted to sale. Thus, if KNHC "rental" units already sold are excluded
from Table 2.11, the number of formal rental units produced in Korea over the
last decade amount to a mere 10,500, which represents less than half of 1Z of
the total number of approximately three million households currently renting.
Table 2.11: FORMAL RENTAL HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY
TYPE OF BUILDER, 1972-83
Number of units Relative
Type of builder constructed share (Z)
KNHC 70,747 87.1
Local governments 6,920 8.5
Private sector 3,538 4.4
Total 81,205 100.0
Source: KRIHS, A Study on Housing Problems and Policy Developments
in Korea, January 1985.
2.33 The policy which the Government, through KNHC, has pursued in the
past to provide rental units on a temporary basis was better than direct
public ownership of rental units but has had a minimal impact on the rental
market. The temporary "rental" period permitted the tenant time to save
toward the down payment required for house purchase. This program also
avoided the difficult financial and management problems associated with direct
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public ownership of rental housing experienced in other countries. More
recently, the Government is considering participat:.on in the provision of
rental housing through KNHC on a more permanent basis. Given the expected
growing pressures on the rental market in the future, there is a need to re-
evaluate the Government's intention to supply rental housing directly and to
examine how the private sector might be stimulated to produce this itself.
The recent changes to building regulations which permit private owners to add
separate entrances and facilities to increase rental supply are considered to
be a step in the right direction.
III. THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
A. Overview of the Financial System
3.01 The financial system in Korea can be divided into three segments
based on the extent of government regulation. The most heavily regulated
segment, or first tier, is composed of the Bank of Korea, deposit-taking banks
including the commercial banks (seven nationwide or "city" banks and ten local
or 'provincial" banks), the specialized banks (including KHB), and the non-
deposit development financial institutions (Korea Development Bank, Korea
Long-term Credit Bank, Export Import Bank). In addition, there were 52
branches of foreign banks in the country at the end of 1984. The second tier
of the financial system is less regulated and consists of a wide diversity of
financial institutions which have emerged since the mid-sixties: savings
institutions (business-oriented mutual savings and finance companies and
household-oriented credit unions), life insurance companies, and investment
companies (merchant banking corporations as well as investment and finance
companies, and security companies serving the securities market). The third
tier of the financial system consists of a large number of financial dealers
operating in the unregulated money market, comuonly known as the curb market.
3.02 The relative importance of the various formal financial institu-
tions, based on the value of assets held, has shifted significantly over the
last ten years, mainly as a result of the interest rates permitted by the
Monetary Board for various services provided (Table 3.1).
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Assets x Assets X
First-tier Institutions
The Bank of Korea 2,174 23 13,713 10
Deposit Money Banks 5,562 57 71,676 54
Comercial Banks (3,632) (37) (43,076) (33)
Specialized Banks (1,930) (20) (28,600) (22)
(The Korea Housing Bank) (168) (2) (2,763) (2)
Development Banks 931 10 17,440 13
Subtotal 8,867 90S 102,829 78Z
Second-tier Institutions
Savings and Trust Institution. 355 4 12,847 10
Insurance Companies 207 2 4,880 4
Investment and Finance Institutions 395 4 11,389 9
Subtotal 957 10% 29,116 22Z
TOTAL FORMAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 9.624 100% 131,995 100%
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. m IX, March,
1985.
Over the last 20 years, the less regulated second-tier institutions have grown
faster than the banking institutions. In particular, the short-term invest-
ment and finance companies (SIFCs) have grown very quickly in recent years.
They were first established as part of the 1972 financial reforms and repre-
sented an effort to institutionalize and regulate some of the larger financial
dealers operating in the unregulated money market. These SIFCs have been
quite successful in their competition with comercial banks as they have en-
joyed more flexible interest rate regulations.
3.03 The unregulated curb market has played an important role in the
economy. Precise estimates of the total size of the curb market are difficult
to make given the nature of its operations. Orders of magnitudes recently
mentioned are that the curb market represents the equivalent of 5-6% of regu-
lated domestic credit to the private sector, 10 of total savings and 25Z of
the money supply. The factors encouraging the existence of this curb market
have been: directed credit and controlled interest rates, the scarcity of
loanable funds, general borrowers in formal markets crowded out by "priority
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borrowers", investors attracted by high but risty rates of return, and under-
capitalized businesses with cash flow problems. A key feature of the curb
market is the absence of controls, most notably on interest rates, which have
been substantially higher than government-regulated interest rates, and the
avoidance of taxes on earnings. It is estimated that the curb market has been
declining in a relative sense, although not in absolute terms, since 1972, the
year for which estimates are the most reliable. That year, the curb market
was estimated to equal 29% of bank lending and 67% of the money supply.
3.04 The curb market is important in the housing finance system in
several ways. Because the banking sector, even as late as 1981, was not
competing vigorously for household deposits except through the two household-
oriented specialized banks, CNB and KHB, and as a consequence of low yields
and unattractive services provided, 65% of household savings and 80X of
borrowings took place in informal markets including the curb market, according
to a 1981 CNB survey. An important share of household savings for housing
purposes takes the form of the key money (chonsei) deposit (see para. 3.11),
common in rental arrangements in Korea, which is frequently deposited by
landlords in the curb market to obtain high returns. The curb market also
provides a source of borrowings to supplement the very small portion of
housing cost financed by formal institutions.
The Term Structure of Interest Rates
3.05 Until the early 1980s, the Korean Government pursued a policy of
detailed administration of interest rates according to purpose, maturity and
sources of funds. The Monetary Board has been responsible for the regulation
of the level and structure of interest rates and has adjusted these rates
periodically according to domestic and international conditions. The most
important feature of the new liberalization policy is the gradual decontrol of
interest rates with the introduction of the prime rate system and the widening
of the interest rate band on lending above the prime rate (increased to a 3.5%
band on April 18, 1985) from a previously uniform lending rate for most
lending activities by first-tier financiai institutions. The interest rate
range is now 10.0-13.5% for loans of one year or more.
3.06 In addition to the widening of the interest rate band, an increased
emphasis on interest rate diffecent5.ation according to loan maturity has
occurred since April 1985. This aspect of policy is crucial to housing mort-
gages, which have the longest maturities of all loans made by the regulated
financial system. The term structure of interest rates for loans, however, is
still highly regulated and, as yet, not well differentiated. For the same
maturity, regulated interest rates can vary within the band, but most loan
maturities are relatively short, and, for the longer-term loans, interest
rates are not much different or even lower than for the shorter-maturity loans
(see Figure 3.1). The past and current interest rate policies on the lending
activities have acted to discourage the commercial banks, finance companies
8/ It has been common for large firms to pay subcontractors with promissory
notes discounted by curb market dealers.
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FIGURE 3. 1
Interest Rates on Loans for First-and Second-Tier Financial
Institutions ab of March, 1984.
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and other formal financial institutions from participating to any significant
extent in the provision of long-term housing loans since short-term loans
receive the same returns. Further differentiation of lending rates according
to maturities is required to encourage greater involvement of formal financial
institutions in the extension of long-term loans for house purchase.
3.07 On the deposit side, the yield structure was already much more
clearly differentiated by maturity than on the lending side (see Figure 3.2).
The April 1985 rate adjustments introduced sharply higher interest rates on
household deposits. In particular, depositors in the new household savings
accounts will receive twice the earlier rate of 6%, or 12% for deposits of
W 20 million or less for a minimum period of six months. Deposits rates
between three and six months can now earn 9%. This last interest rate adjust-
ment represents a clear effort to close the gap between the regulated and the
unregulated sectors of the financial system to rechannel funds away from the
curb market. If the inflation rate remains in the targeted range of 2-3%, the
real rate of interest on deposits in bank savings accounts will be as high as
9-10%.
B. The Formal Housing Finance System
3.08 Currently, the institutional structure of the housing finance system
is very simple. Only two deposit money banks, KHB and CNB, are financing
housing mortgages; the other banks have had no interest in lending for housing
given the long maturities and low regulated interest rates of mortgages as
well as the lack of any refinancing facility. The other major institutional
component is NHF which was established to finance low-income housing. The NHF
was separated from KHB in 1981 as a government-directed fund account, and
since then its volume of lending activities has been equal to or greater than
that of KHB. In addition, the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
(NACF), which functions in Korea as a specialized deposit bank, has made
housing loans on a small scale. Since 1981, a few government retirement
systems and life insurance companies have contributed to UHF's sources of
funds or made mortgage loans. The outstanding housing loans supplied by the
formal housing finance institutions through end-1984 are shown in Table 3.2.
Since NHF is managed by KHB staff, KHB actually originated about 84Z of all
the housing loans made by financial institutions in Korea. The table does not
show the contributions to housing finance from the informal sector, which are
estimated by a recent KRIHS study 9 to be about three times larger than from
formal institutions.
9/ KRIHS, A Study on Housing Problems and Policy Developments in Korea,
January, 1985.
- 25 -
Table 3.2: OUTSTANDING HOUSING LOANS AS OF END-1984
Billion Won Market Share (Z)
National Housing Fund 2,127.0 46.9
Korea Housing Bank 1,660.7 36.6
National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation 393.5 8.7
Citizens National Bank 278.6 6.1
Insurance Companies 75.8 1.7
Total 4,535.6 100.0
Source: Government data provided to the Bank mission.
3.09 The housing finance system is underdeveloped compared to the size of
the housing market and the potential demand for financial services. This
underdevelopment can be gauged in various ways. The voltme of outstanding
housing loans (mortgages and other) as a proportion of GNP is very low; this
ratio was 6.9% in 1984 (see Table 3.3). By comparison, estimates of similar
ratios varied from 15Z in Japan, to 28% in France and the United Kingdom, 41%
in the United States and 64Z in Switzerland in 1982. These values, hovever,
are only indicative because of variations among national reporting systems and
because they are affected by a variety of factors such as the length of
mortgage maturities, loan-to-value ratios, the tax treatment of housing, and
the level of interest payments. It must be noted that the Korean ratio has
more than quadrupled since 1974, but this improvement is measured against a
very low base.
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Table 3.3: OUTSTANDING HOUSING LOANS AS A PROPORTION OF CNP
Outstanding housing
loans from formal
Year financial institutions GNP Loans/GNP
(Billion won) (Billion won) (Z)
1974 91.0 5,378.10 1.7
1975 121.7 7,503.10 1.6
1976 166.2 10,092.23 1.6
1977 228.5 13,881.11 1.6
1978 328.9 18,115.41 1.8
1979 491.4 24,225.30 2.0
1980 1,026.1 31,248.72 3.3
1981 1,557.4 37,204.98 4.2
1982 2,399.8 51,786.60 4.6
1983 3,336.9 58,428.40 5.7
1984 4,535.6 65,345.00 6.9
Source: Government data provided to the Bank mission.
3.10 An alternative measure of the degree of underdevelopment of the
Korean housing finance system is the ratio of housing loans to value of new
housing constructed (see Table 3.4). While this ratio has also improved
rapidly from 9Z in 1979 to 26X in 1983, it again indicates that financial
institutions are serving only a small part of the total demand for housing
finance services - the balance of requirements has to be met through informal
means. In the OECD countries, between 602 and 100I of the value of new con-
struction was covered by new mortgage loans during the 1970s. The full scope
of the demand for housing fiaance could be better understood if reliable
information existed on the annual value of sales of existing houses in
addition to the value of new houses. In 1983, about 226,000 new units were
built representing a gross addition of about 4% to the existing housing stock
of about 5.7 million housing units. Given the very high degree of housing
mobility in Korea, where the average household has moved every four years in
receneojears, it is estimated that about 15% of the stock changes hands every
year.° This implies that the total value of housing transactions is about
10/ In terms of "chains-of-move", this implies that the production of one new
unit generates three household moves across the existing stock. See
Ridha Ferchiou, "The Indirect Effects of New Housing Construction in
Developing Countries", Urban Studies (1982), 19, pp. 167-176. For the
purpose of comparison, in the United States where mobility is lower than
in Korean urban markets, one unit of new construction generated 3.5
moves. The Korean ratio of 3 is an underestimate but accounts for the
presence of renters in some of these moves.
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four times that of new housing. On that basis, the ratio of loans to value of
total housing transactions is on the order of less then 102. Thus, the
transactions for house purchases or, what is even more unusual, for rentals
(as discussed below) require a high level of accumulated savings (wealth)
rather than income (cash flow). Also, there is a strong reliance on informal
sources of funds for house purchases which are not channeled through formal
financial institutions.
Table 3.4: HOUSING LOANS AS A PROPORTION
OF NEW HOUSING CONSTRUCTED
Net Housing Loans by Source Loan-to-
Retire- Value of value
Year KHB NHF CNB NACF ment Insurance new housing rs io
funds companies Total constructed (Z)
----------------------------- (Billion won) -----
1979 194.6 - 1.4 96.2 - 6.0 298.2 1,965.20 9
1980 284.3 - 11.6 82.6 - 8.7 384.2 2,613.03 10
1981 315.8 233.9 29.9 57.2 - 11.5 648.3 2,351.22 25
1982 419.6 264.1 309.8 18.9 - 27.5 1,039.9 3,213.04 32
1983 474.3 500.7 44.2 35.2 23.2 34.0 1,111.6 4.326.93 26
1984 346.3 610.6 31.3 34.3 n.a. 21.7 1,044.2 4,628.78 23
Source: Government data provided to the Bank mission.
C. The Informal Sources of Housing Finance
"Chonsei"
3.11 A type of financial claim particular to Kor-. is the "chonsei" or
key money deposit system extensively used in the rental market. The chonsei
system consists of a payment of a large cash deposit to lndlords in lieu of
monthly rental payments. This cash deposit can be increa3ed by the landlord
during the tenancy and must be refunded in its entirety by the landlord when
the tenant vacates the dwelling. The interest forego:. by the renter is
expected to cover the implicit rental value of the dwelling. Instead of
raising rents when the rental market becomes tight, la-;ilords increase the
amount of the chonsei. Chonsei deposits not only permit access to rental but,
when refunded, act as an important source of housing finance for house
purchase. This pervasive system was developed in response to earlier economic
and financial market conditions when inflation was high, regulated interest
rates were low and housing w.ss in extremely short supply. The chonsei system
served the Korean market quite well at earlier stages of developaient, but
continuing financial development should lead to its replacement by better
financial services provided by institutions. It is also an indicator of the
limited penetration of formal financial institutions in Korean household
markets. Because of its unique features and its significance as a source of
housing finance, a detailed presentation is helpful to this review.
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Table 3.5: "CHONSEI" ESTIMATES, 1983 /a
Rental of Entire Unit
Average
dwelling value Chonsei Ratio
(W'OOO) (WIC(w'O)(x
Location
Seoul 22,000 9,595 44
Large cities 15,597 5,181 33
Small cities 16,819 5,423 32
Average 18,930 6,673 35
Type of Unit
Detached Housing 24,956 5,791 23
Tenement Units 16,476 5,893 36
Apartments 18,014 7,174 40
Rental of Part of the Unit, All Locations
Chonsei Amount Frequency (Z)





Average value 5.4 million von
/a Figures are illustrative and not fully representative because the sample
is small.
Source: KHB, Survey of Borrowers, 1983.
3.12 The level of resources that renters have to provide in a chonsei
contract is very substantial. In general, when KHB or CNB make loans against
housing collateral, they routinely assume that the owner has generated a
chonsei claim equal to 30X of the current market value of the house or rooms
rented. Of course, this kind of ratio varies according to the type of unit
and local market conditions, as illustrated in Table 3.5 above. Therefore, in
Korea not only ownership but also access to rental are determined by the
financial savings already accumulated by the renter instead of his current
income. Because it is not always possible to accumulate su";n lhrge financial
savings for housing, various forms of rental contracts exist suchi as partial
or declining chonsei, which include blends of key money and monthly pay-
ments. Pure chonsei, which was the most common form of rental contract i& the
past, is now gradually being replaced by a greater use of partial chonsei and
monthly rental payments.
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3.13 Crude estimates of the aggregate magnitude of the chonsei claims
compared to the size of the housing finance syst^m can be made on the basis of
the number of fully or partially rented units, the average value of a housing
unit, and the ratio of chonsei to the value of the space rented (whole or part
of a unit). Table 3.6 presents estimates based on the 1980 Census. These
numbers show orders of magnitude which would need to be refined on the basis
of surveys to take into account the actual distribution of housing prices, the
subset of units rented and actual proportion of pure chonsei, partial chonsei,
declining chonsei, and other rental contracts. However, there is no doubt
that the financial claims generated by the chonsei system have been consider-
ably larger than the outstanding institutional lending for housing by a factor
of about 5.7 in 1980, and probably by over two times in 1984. Aggregate
chonsei claims are also larger than net outstanding mortgage loans. These
comparisons clearly demonstrate that there are still major opportunities to
increase the formal financing of housing by channeling chonsei through the
financial system before triggering a displacement of savings from other
sectors toward the housing sector.
Table 3.6: TOTAL "'CHONSEI" RENTAL CLAIMS IN 1980
Value of Chonsei
No. of housing units /a (in W mln) /b
Whole Cities Whole Cities
country country
Households renting 697,113 498,072 3,137,000 2,241,324
entire unit
Households renting 1,501,533 1,207,316 2,702,759 2,173,169
part of unit
Total 2.198,646 1,705,388 5,839,759 4,414,493
Sources: (a) EPB, Population and Housing Census, 1980.
(b) Based on a median housing value in 1983 of W 15 million and
chonsei ratios of 30% for exclusive rental and 12% for partially
rented units.
3.14 The volume of chonsei claims is evidence of inefficient financial
intermediation in the housing sector, both for landlords and for tenants,
compared to the new possibilities offered by financial institutions. Under
the chonsei system, landlords are forced to become financial micro-intermedia-
ries without always having the necessary skills or the possibility of diversi-
fying their risks. They face a yield problem because they need to obtain a
yield on the chonsei deposit equal to the implicit rental value of the unit.
They also have a liquidity problem and must plan their investments well enough
to be able to return the deposit when required, even if additional borrowing
is difficult. They may very well face a term-intermediation risk if they are
using these short-term funds to finance a long-term investment. There is also
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a significant denomination intermediation risk due to the lumpiness of the
chonsei. This last risk increases when curb market interest rates are high
and the housing market is slow; in such situations the lumpiness of the
chonsei system can force distress real estate sales if renters urgently need
their chonsei back, which thus further contributes to market fluctuations.
3.15 The chonsei system evolved in a situation characterized by very
tight housing markets and underdeveloped financial services. The tenants are
required to provide large lump-sum payments instead of relying on their
monthly income cash flow: the chonsei amount is typically equal to one year of
income, frequently more. Tenants ass-me all default risks in the transaction
- their savings are only partially protected by current rental laws, while
landlords receive all or part of their rental payments in advance. In cases
when they are experiencing serious financial liquidity problems, renters may
even be forced to move out in orde- to recover their deposit and meet other
obligations. Many renters borrow a portion of their chonsei deposit. While
it is clear that the implicit yield for renters on their chonsei deposit
should be estimated at curb market rates, they have a reduced choice of using
banking facilities for depositing their savings more safely and efficiently.
The chonsei system may also cause households to rent less space than they
would under a monthly rate system because of problems in assembling the
deposit. Finally, it is possible that the extensive use of chonsei discou-
rages rental of separate units because of the large sums required, thereby
limiting access to rental of entire units to middle and upper income families.
3.16 Although the chonsei system provides a high level of security to
landlords, the imputed rents would indicate a market where rents are compe-
titively set. The value of an average chonsei deposit, calculated by taking
the curb market interest rate, is less than 1Z per month of the value of the
-anit or rooms rented. The high level of mobility, the absence of any distort-
ing price controls, and the fact that there are no landlords with monopolistic
power tend to hold these imputed rents down to a rate which is not excessive
in the economic context. If a monthly payment system were to emerge on a
widespread basis, it is likely that the demand for rental accommodation would
rise, because households with good incomes but low savings would be able to
rent more or better housing.
3.17 Monthly rental contracts have become more popular for some time,
r:sing from 23Z of renters in 1975 ,o 37% in 1980. Market conditions, since
1981, are likely to accelerate the replacement of the chonsei system with
monthly rental arrangements, since household savings with banking institutions
%re no longer penalized by inflation. Recent surveys, undertaken by KRIHS in
1985, show that partial chonsei contracts, under which a portion of the rental
payment is on a monthly basis, are now more widespread than the pure chonsei
concracts prevalent in the past. Both landlords and renters should find it to
their advantage to use the services of financial institutions. The shift from
negative real deposit rates in the 1970s to large positive rates at financial
institutions since 1981 is making curb market transactions relatively less
attractive for most households. With recent interest rate increases, house-
hold savings deposits of six months or more can earn 12X interest, while risky
curb market yields are around 22%, and moving down, as compared to annual
deposit rates of 6% and curb market yields of 26% of just a few years ago.
The evolution of the rental payment system could facilitate this transition.
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Other Informal Sources of Housing Finance
3.18 Information regarding the other sources of financing required to
supplement formal sector loans for house purchases is provided in a variety of
surveys conducted by KHB and the public housihg developer, KNHC. A particu-
larly detailed survey undertaken by KHB in 1982 provides useful insights for a
sample of its borrowers. The results of the survey are presented in Table 3.7
below, which shows a breakdown between previous owners and those who are
purchasing a house for the first time.





Sale of Previous House 20 51 -
Key Money or Chonsei 13 - 23
Savings 25 14 31
Gifts 2 2 3
Subtotal 60 67 57
Financial institutions
KHB 34 29 36
Other 2 1 2
Subtotal 36 30 38
Other
Rental Income 2 2 2
Other 2 1 3
Subtotal 4 3 5
TOTAL 100 100 100
Source: KHB, Survey of Borrowers, 1983.
In aggregate terms, 602 of the funds for house purchases came from the
purchasers' own funds, and 4% was derived from other sources to supplement the
36% provided by financial institutions. No substantial differences are found
in the composition of the broad sources of funds between pre-owners and first-
time owners. Obviously, the ratio of own funds to housing prices is
significantly higher for pre-owners than for first-time owners due to the
considerable financing derived from the sale of houses.
3.19 Although this survey portrays a rather precise picture of how KHB
borrowers finance their purchases, on average, it may not represent the actual
situation faced by many home buyers. First, the numbers reported in the table
are averages where many borrowers have a zero entry in some categories. For
example, although gifts account for only 2% of the funds used, on average, for
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those who received a gift the actual share is 22X of the value of the unit
purchased. Although the data is not compiled in a way to show this for each
source, the story is likely to be similar. According to information from CNB
and the studies of the curb market, it is likely that many purchasers have
outstanding loans against their existing houses or chonsei and may be
reporting savings which are actually informal borrowings.
D. Mobilization of Savings for Housing Finance
3.20 Domestic household savings, which are the most important source of
housing finance, and the most volatile component of national savings, have
risen significantly during the period 1960-80, despite frequently negative
real interest rates on bank demand and time deposits when few attractive
financial assets existed. The gross national savings rate rose from about 10%
in the early 1960s to about 27% in 1984,._' which is considered a high rate,
although it remained less than in Japan (over 32%) and Singapore (about 29%)
over the same period. Household savings increased from about 22 of CNP in the
early 1960s to a peak of 12.4% in 1978 and 9.3% in 1984 but have not been very
sensitive to the low, regulated interest rates of the past. The main deter-
minant of total real household savings during the periodf ould seem to have
been the rapid rate of growth in real household income 2 and curb market
interest rates, which have been considerably higher than regulated rates and
consistently positive in real terms (see Figure 3.3).117 It is expected that
the current period of significant economic growth with positive real interest
rates in the regulated sector would continue to encourage high levels of
household savings over the near term.
ll/ Gross national savings are defined here as CNP plus net current transfers
from the rest of the world less consumption, which represents savings by
the household, corporate, government and foreign sectors.
12/ Kittack Hong, "Monetary Policies in Semi-Industrial Countries: Theory
and Evidence from Korea and Taiwan", Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford,
December 1983.
13/ See Sweder van Wijnbergen, Short-Run Macro-Economic Adjustment "olicies
in South Korea, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 510, 1982; also Shahid
Yusuf and R.K. Peters, Savings Behavior and Its Implications for Domestic
Resource Mobilization: The Case of the Republic of Korea, World Bank
Staff Working Paper No. 628, 1984.
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FIGURE 3.3
Curb Market Rates, 1963-1984.
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Srource: BOK Surveys
3.21 Based on surveys of household and corporate behavior, it is
estimated that in 1981 only about one-third of savings from these sectors were
kept in formal financial institutions, while about two-thirds were channeled
through the informal financial system. The shrinking gap between interest
rates in the curb market, and those in the regulated financial system, is
creating the climate for a shift of savings to the formal sector. However,
the informal sector is still estimated to handle more than half of household
and corporate savings. With further liberalization of the financial system
through policies of progressively decontrolled interest rates and the creation
of more flexible savings instruments, it is expected that it would be possible
to rechannel these savings from the informal sector to the banking system. As
long as RHB offers interest rates competitive with other formal financial
institutions, savings deposits at KHB are likely to increase, which would also
increase the funds available for housing finance purposes without neceasarily
requiring a diversion of resources to the formal financial system from other
sectors. The net benefit of an increased flow of savings resources through
the formal financial institutionis wouild be to increase the efficiency of
financing investments in general and housing investments in particular.
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IV. THE HOUSING FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
A. The Korea Housing Bank (KHB)
Background
4.01 KHB was established in 1967 14/ to stimulate an increase in the
supply of housing by having a banking institution devoted to raising and
managing the funds going to the sector. The KHB's mandate was stated in very
broad terms. It was, essentially, to improve housing conditions in general,
and the distribution of housing in particular, by providing a larger supply of
housing finance to low- and middle-income households nationwide. The KHB was
to do this while imposing the least possible financial and administrative
burden on the Government. It was provided with a number of fund mobilization
instruments to help it achieve this mandate. The Government assured control
over the bank by retaining the power to name the Board of Directors, the chief
executive officers and the auditor as well as by fully controlling its deposit
and lending interest rates. The recently enacted Government-Invested
Enterprise Management Act, which includes KHB among 24 institutions, should
enable KHB to function somewhat more independently in the future by having
greater autonomy in setting its own objectives and being judged by its ability
to meet them.
4.02 The Government amended KHB's legislation in April 1981 in order to
formally separate the low-inc9pq Windov from KHB's other operations through
the establishment of the NF. _ This separation was intended to allow the
two agencies to focus on distinct segments of the market and thereby be more
efficient and effective in achieving housing objectives. The KHB was to focus
on provi .g "market" housing while NHF was to fc _s on providing "social"
housing._ While this separation was in principle sound, it has proven
difficult to achieve in practice, since the two institutions have overlapping
mandates and activities.
14/ The Government had set up an account within the Korea Development Bank
called the Housing Fund Depository in 1957, which essentially served to
channel some of the post-Korean War foreign aid tc the housing sector.
15/ Although a separate entity, NHF is managed by KHB staff on a fee basis.
16/ Market housing refers to housing provided by private sector developers
which was expected to serve middle- and upper-income groups while social
housing refers to housing provided by public sector agencies which was to
serve the lower end of the market.
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Sources of Funds
4.03 The main sources of funds for KHB's operations are deposits (demand,
time, savings and contractual schemes) made by its clients and, to a lesser
extent, loan repayments (see Table 4.1). The fastest growing (87Z over
1980-84) and most important source of funds (46Z of total deposits as of end-
1984) has been the time deposits. These deposits have a maturity of three to
twelve months and should benefit most from the April 1985 changes in interest
rates, which sharply diEfqientiated the short-term interest rates for deposits
of different maturities.- In addition, the Government has made available to
KHB the Worker's Asset Formation Deposit (WAFD), a powerful mobiliza:ion
scheme providing KHB with an advantage in raising funds - until recently, when
the scheme was also made available to other deposit banks. The WAFD accounts
have offered interest rates roughly comparable to curb market rates, and
currently the annual yield is up to 23.9Z, providing a real rate of return cf
19Z. Since KHB pays only 7.6-8.0% of the interest while the Government pays
the rest, the future of WAFD as a source of housing finance may be limited
because of the very high element of government subsidy. As a result of new
lower limits imposed by the Government on the maximum income a saver can have
in order to enroll in a WAFD contract, these funds have been declining as a
share of total funds raised by KHB, from 40% of deposits as of December 1978
to about 14% as of December 1983. Since WAFD contracts are now available at
other banks, their share as a source of funds for KHB is expected to decrease
even further in the near term. However, KHB has been able to take advantage
of other non-price incentives to mobilize resources through its housing and
general installment savings deposits, in which potential borrowers must have
participated before being eligible for housing and other loans.
17/ 6% for less than three months, 9% for three to six months, and 12% for
8iX months or more.
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Table 4.1: KHB's SOURCES OF FUNDS (NET OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS)
1982, 1983
(W min)
1982 z 1983 x
Internally Generated Funds:
Demand, time and savings deposits 372,419 53.4 473,235 52.2
WAFDs 90,181 12.9 126,091 13.9
Housing instailment savings deposits /a 43,676 7.2 81,305 9.0
Loan collections 44,844 6.5 72,440 8.0
Accrued interest from installment 132,697 19.0 149,041 16.4
savings deposits
Subtotal 689,817 99.0 902,112 99.5
Capital contributions /b 7,000 1.0 5,000 0.5
Total 696,817 100.0 907,112 100.0
/a Contractual savings scheme required for housing loans.
7b 94% of the paid-in capital of W 29,000 million as of end-1984 was
contributed by the Government.
Source: KHB, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
Loans for Housing
4.04 The KHB's mandate is to lend funds primarily for housing purposes,
as its name would imply. However, KHB is not completely specialized in
housing lending, since it is permitted to advance loans for commercial
purposes up to 20z of its loanable funds. The distribution of loans according
to purpose in 1982-84 is shown in Table 4.2. Within the housing category, KHB
offers a number of types of loans, most of which are made to purchasers of new
houses. As a maximum, KHB finances the purchase of new houses up to a size of
30 py. Consistent with the Government's objective to use land efficiently, an
increasing share of loans is advanced for purchaser of apartments and row
houses. KHB has an extensive network of branches (149 in 1984) which enables
it to make loans nationwide. In 1983, half the loans were advanced to
borrowers in Seoul where the largest and strongest housing market exists.
- 37 -
Table 4.2: KHB LOANS BY PURPOSE, 1982-84
(W min)
1982 1983 1984
Horsing loans 376,719 447,835 328,956
Housing material production loans 2,600 2,840 2,715
Other housing-related loans 18,845 23,416 14,560
Subtotal, housing loans 398,164 474,091 346,231
Commercial loans 29,658 60,622 33,221
Other loans 3,813 15,934 16,752
Total 431,635 550,647 396,204
Housing loans as a proportion of total loans (Z) 92.2 86.1 87.4
Source: KHB, Statistical Yearbook, 1984.
Terms of Loans
4.05 Loans made to purchasers of new houses had twenty-year maturities
and an 11.5Z interest rate as of November 1984. These loans are of a level-
payment type with a variable interest rate that can be adjusted by KHB during
the repayment period. Since 1980, general interest rates have been declining
progressively, and thus interest rates on existing KHB mortgage contracts have
been adjusted downward as well. However, there is no indication that interest
rates on mortgage contracts were adjusted upward, in the 1970s when interest
rates were rising, most probably because of political constraints. More
recently, with the increasing interest rates brought about by financial
liberalization, KHB adjusted interest rates on existing mortgage contracts
upward from the 102 rate prevailing in 1983 to 11.51 in 1984. The most
significant feature regarding the terms of the housing loans issued by KHB is
the small share of housing costs covered. Although the regulations permit
lending for between 70% and 80Z of the value of a unit, the loan ceilings and
valuation procedures work together to make the average loan-to-value ratio
only 0.32, according to 1983 KHB data. Also, specific ceilings for loan
amounts up to a maximum of V 10 million are established by unit size, and
there are restrictions on the age of units financed (not older than five
years). The total effect of these conditions on loans to home buyers is
essentially to make only one financial product available to all. A greater




4.06 The RHB is rare compared to lending institutions in other countries
in that it does not attempt to verify the income of its borrowers, instead
relying on the high level of equity from buyers to promote good repayment
patterns. In effect KHB lends against the collateral rather than the
repayment capability of the borrower. Even though this practice poses no
threat to KHB, as long as the relative size of its loans remains small, there
is a public interest in knowing about the characteristics of those who receive
a service such as housing finance, for which the supply is limited by public
policy and the price is held below the market clearing level.
4.07 The KHB conducts an annual survey of its borrowers which reports,
inr-r alia, on their income. The survey reports income measured as "total
household income" - which includes income derived from assets as well as wages
and salaries, and "total labor income" - which includes only wages and
salaries. According to the 1983 survey results, the distribution of total
household incomes of KHB borrowers does not deviate significantly from that of
the cross-section of urban households, while the distribution of total labor
income of KHB borrowers considerably overrepresents the upper-income strata of
urban households. The mean for KHB borrowers, as measured by total household
income, is the 49th percentile, and for Lotal labor income the 77th percentile
of their respective distributions. In other words, KHB borrowers are those
whose labor earnings are relatively high but whose non-labor incomes, which
primarily depend upon the level of asset accumulation, are relatively low.
The relatively small maximum house size limitation of 30 py has not deterred
this middle- to upper-income clientele for KHB.
Problem Areas in Operations
4.08 Internally, KHB has been operated efficiently and, given the
constraints under which it must work, has consistently improved its perfor-
mance. However, the scale of KHB's operations has remained small relative to
the size of the housing market, because its management is not free to alter
mobilization techniques, lending instruments or interest rates in response to
demand. The administered interest rates are responsible for the recent poor
profitability of KHB. The KHB's net income has been declining steadily and
rapidly (-25.7% p.a.) despite a fairly substantial growth in revenues (27.2%)
over the period 1978-83. In fact, KHB incurred operating losses in 1982 and
1983 - amounting to about 6% of revenue in the latter year, although net
incomes were reported to be positive during these years due to "specific
profits" in the form of interest payments received from the Bank of Korea on
required reserves. This situation is a result of the very small margins under
which the institution has been required to operate since 1978 (as shown in
Table 4.3), and it is expected to deteriorate further with the new negative
spread between the six-month deposit rate of 12% and the regulated interest
rate of 11.5.
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Table 4.3: KHB INTEREST SPREADS
(Z p.a.)
Average cost Average return Average
of deposits on loans spread
1978 12.7 10.9 -1.8
1979 11.9 12.5 0.6
1980 14.8 13.6 -1.2
1981 15.6 16.5 0.9
1982 11.8 12.4 0.6
1983 8.8 9.7 0.9
Source: KHB, Annual Report, 1978-83.
4.09 The central problem faced by KHB is that it has not been able to
mobilize and lend enough to make a significant contribution to alleviating the
very crowded conditions in urban housing. The constrained size of the hous5ng
finance system relative to demand has led to rationing procedures, which have
served to make it more difficult for lower- and middle-income households to
use the low loan-to-value mortgages offered. Specific measures are needed
which would allow KHB to grow in response to mortgage demand while at the same
time maintaining a healthy financial position.
B. The National Housing Fund (NHF)
Background
4.10 The NHF was established on July 20, 1981 with the objective of
raising and facilitating the supply of housing finance to enable the Govern-
ment to carry out its overall National Housing Construction Plan. It is a
"fund" of the Central Government which raises resources through various tax-
like instruments and deposits, lending them out to public sector developers
for house construction after which they are converted to mortgages for home
buyers. The Fund is essentially an expanded version of the National Housing
Construction Loan (NHCL) Program started in 1973, is operated by KHB, and
subsequently became a separate fund distinct from the KHB. While KHB answers
to MOF, the NHF is directly under the control of MOC, which determines its
overall policies on the advice of its Housing Bureau/Policy Division. For
administrative purposes, the day-to-day management of the Fund has been
delegated to the President of KHB and his designated staff.
4.11 There are a number of reasons why the Government chose to remove the
NHF accounts from KHB's activities to support the separation of "social
housing" from "market housing" lending purposes. It wanted to enlarge the
size of the housing finance system, and it was easier to raise funds from
government sources if NHF was directly responsible to the Government. While
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NHF's pred hssor, the NHCL program, was empowered to tap a variety of
resources,- it historically relied on housing bonds for the bulk of its
loanable funds. However, the volume mobilized did not grow rapidly enough and
was considered by the Government to be insufficient to meet its plans for
expanding the housing finance system. Also, since the NHF, as a government
fund, was not subject to domestic credit controls (which apply to all deposit
banks including KHB), its separation from KHB provided greater flexibility in
its activities. Lastly, the separation of the NHF and KHB accounts permitted
each to be reported separately, so that the performance of each could be indi-
vidually monitored.
4.12 The NHF has quickly become a major player in housing finance. Since
being established in 1981, NHF has made 312,175 loans for W 1,895,915 million
(to end-1984). This is 23Z more units financed and 32% more resources lent
than by KHB for the same period.
Sources of Funds
4.13 In contrast to KHB, which relies almost totally on various savings
deposits, NHF relies to a great extent on funds from various government
sources (see Table 4.4). National housing bonds are the largest source of
funds for the NHF and are expected to continue to be so for some time.
Presently, there are two types of housing bonds for which the Government
guarantees the repayment of principal and interest at maturity: (a) Type I,
which are compulsory for those requiring permits or licenses for various types
of activities; and (b) Type II, which were initiated in 1983 with the
introduction of the bond-bidding system for the sale of privately built
condominiums. Both are low cost sources of funds for NHF, with Type I bonds
currently yielding 5% fixed interest per year with a maturity of 5 years, and
Type II bonds currently yielding 3% per year with a maturity of 20 years. The
NHF's liabilities are concentrated in maturities of less than five years,
while almost all loans are for 20 years.
18/ Including national housing bonds, housing lottery, central government
loans, foreign loans, as well as loans from KHB, agricultural cooperative
unions and local governments.
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Table 4.4: NWF'S SOURCES OF FUNDS (NET OF REPAYMENTS)
1982, 1983
(W min)
1982 x 1983 X
Internally Generated Funds:
Savings deposits 53,435 U'.5 130,644 14.1
Lottery funds 7,830 1.7 9,966 1.1
Loan repayments 49,577 10.6 44,721 4.8
Accrued interest on bonds
and other income 72,922 15.7 180,636 19.5
Balance carried over from
previous year 17,870 3.8 198,892 21.5
Subtotal 201,634 43.3 564,p89 61.0
Borrowings:
National housing bonds - Type I 179,527 38.5 223,235 24.1
Type II - - 68,097 7.4
Pension funds 45,767 9.8 24,545 2.7
Foreign loans (IBRD) - - 794 -
Subtotal 225,294 48.3 316,671 34.2
Government contributions 39,G00 8.4 44,000 4.8
Total 465,928 100.0 925,530 100.0
Source: KHB, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
4.14 With the establishment of the independent NHF, two new government
funding sources have become available for the housing finance system. They
are direct equity contributions from the Central Government and variou9
national pension funds. Beginning in 1981, the Government instructed - the
manage 18 of several national pension funds to make deposits into the NHF. A
small - portion of the pension investment funds (excluding member contri-
butions which are managed in a special account) previously deposited with com-
mercial banks was diverted for use by the NHF, which pays the same interest
19/ As per the Housing Construction Acceleration Law, Article 10, Part 2.
20/ Estimated at less than 5% during 1981 and 1982.
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rate as would be paid by the comercial banks.-11 The term of the borrowings
from the various pension funds is three years.
4.15 NHF currently offers one type of savings scheme for its depositors,
known as the National Houqing Preemption Subscription Deposit Scheme. This
deposit scheme was designed to induce prospective purchasers to make deposits
in advance for the whole part of the down paya.lent. Although in the past
priority for loans was based on the size of deposit, which in some cases
favored those with higher incomes, the regul ions have been modified to give
priority to those who have been "homeless" - for three years or more ijn a
particular administrative district and to long-term savers. Another source of
funds for NHF is the Olympic lottery funds (which replaced the housing lottery
in April 1983). Housing lottery tickets have been sold to the public to
finance national housing projects since 1969. It has the twin objectives of
raising funds for both Olympic facility construction and housing development,
with about 35% of the net revenues earmarked for national housing projects.
The remaining sources of funds for NHF's program include repayments of housing
loans, foreign loans and other income.
Loans for Housing
4.16 Housing loans from NHF are initially made available for the
construction of new houses built by public sector developers, primarily local
governments, and KNHC. National housing funds are currently provided in the
form of housing construction and housing lottery loans. National housing
construction loans, which represented about 99% of NHF's outstanding loans as
of end-1983, are intended for the construction of relatively small houses
built in large quantities to be sold to lower-income families purchasing homes
for the first time. The loan to the public developer is converted to
mortgages and passed on to each purchaser at the time of house sale. A small
portion of NHF's loans for construction are made available for special
projects and rental housing. Included in the caLegury of special projects are
disaster relief, redevelcpment and solar housing projects. Housing lottery
loans, which represented about 0.9Z of outstanding loans at end-1983, are made
to veterans and families of those who died in service. The remaining 0.1% of
NHF's portfolio of loans consists of loans to small private developers for
aite dev1loomepnt- which werp inherited from the NHCL oroaram- Currentlv. NHF
does not advance loans to private developers (except for a small group of
locally registered builders who construct small-sized housing units for low-
and moderate-income families), who can, however, seek financing from KHB and
CNB. As an upper limit, the NHF does not finance units greater than 25.7 py,
which is considered to be the size of a moderate-income house. NHF loans are
distributed through KHB's branch network to all nine provinces of the country
and to Seoul and Busan cities. For 1982/83, more than 502 of all lo:.ns
advanced were in the Seoul, Geonggi and Geongnam Regions.
21/ A three year savings deposit at a commercial bank earns 12% p.a. since
April 1985.
22/ Meaning those who have been renters and have not owned a house.
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Terms of Loans
4.17 Loans from NHF are made to individuals for the purchase of new
houses at a current interest rate of 10.0% to be repaid over 20 years with one
year grace on principal, on a graduated payment mortgage (CPM) basis, whereby
payments in-rease by a predetermined amount over the life of the mortgage and
interest rates are permitted to vary. The terms of loasns to reterans and
families of those who died in service are at a lower rate of :.nterest, which
was 4% in 1984, to be repaid over 20 years on a GPM basis. S4.nce general
interest rates have been declining progressively since 1980, t:he variable
interest rates on existing NHF mortgage contracts have oeen adjusted downward,
as have KHB contracts, from their peak of 172 in 1980 to a low of 10% in
1982. Also, loan ceilings are established by house size, as with KHB, up to a
maxiumum amount of W 7.5 million, and loans are essentially limited to new
houses produced by public developers.
4.18 Prior to NHFts establishment, the former NHCL program was restricted
to the financing of 20-40Z of the total housing price, which included land and
house price. This meant that potential home purchasers were required to
provide a down payment of 60-80% of the housing price, wihich was prohibitive
for the low-income groups. This limitation was removed for 14HF, so that it
could provide financing for approximately 50% of the housing cost, on average,
during the G-vernment's Fifth Plan period (1982-86). Loan ceilings are
established, which permit financing of up to 60% of the houf.e cost for the
smaller units (less than 15 py), with the proportion of finjincing decreasing
as house size i-.creases.
Housing_Loan Clientele
4.19 Although NHF's clientele is intended to be lower-income families, it
is very difficult to assess tUHF's ability to target its mortgages to this
group due to the lack of an income test when loans are ma.ie. Current public
policy thinking is that the size of unit is a good determinant of the income
level of the home buyer, since it is believed that only low-income families
wou-ld purchase small units. Furthermore, frv.. _n operational view-point,
incomes are not verified when mortgage applications are reviewed, because the
high down payments indicate that home buvers have substantial amounts invested
in their houses, thus making the likelihood of default very 3mall. Clients of
NHF could have somewhat lower incomes than KHB clients due to the lower down
payment requirements and softer GPM repayment terms provided which make home
purchase somewhat easier. Actually, clients are likely to be more middle- to
upper-income than lower-income, because housir.g is in short supply for all
groups - implying keen competition for available units, and because under KHB
programs, where incomes are known, middle- to upper-income buyers purchase
similar size units. Without an income test, government programs which attempt
to target benefits to lower-income families become ineffective.
Comparison of NHF and KHB Lending Activities
4.20 Comparisons of NHF's lending performance in 1983 with that of KHB
are made in Tables 4.6 ar.d 4.7 to highlight the differences between the public
and private sector reles in housing finance. The results demonstrate that
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there is not much difference between IHF and KHB in terms of the size or type
of units financed. For example, in 1983 the average size of an NHF-financed
unit was 16.6 py versus 19.1 py for a KHB-financed unit, which is largely
explained by the different mix of unit types financed. Eighty-two percent of
NHF loans were for apartment purchases, 14% for row-houses and only 4Z for
single family dwellings. KHB financed 16% single family dwellings, 36% row
houses and only 48Z apartments. The primary difference in the activities of
NHF and KHB is seen in terms of the mechanism by which their respective loans
are made available. The NHF lends mainly to public developers who onlend to
individuals, whereas the bulk of KHB funds are lent directly to individuals
and private contractors. In addition, there are no significant differences in
the terms offered on their respective housing loans (see Table 4.5), except
for down payments. NHF lends for about 50Z, on average, of the total house
price compared to about 30%, on average, for KHB. In 1983, NHF was about 6Z
larger than KHB, both in terms of number of units financed and volume of funds
lent, since it lent W 500.8 billion for 81,265 units versus W 474.1 billion
for 76,996 units by KHB.
Table 4.5: TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF KHB AND NHF HOUSING LOANS
(as of December 1984)
KHB NHF
Eligible house size Below 30 pyong Below 25.7 pyong
Interest rate 11.4% /a 1G.0Z
Loan amount 5-10 million won 4-7.5 million won
Terms 3-20 years 20 years, 1 year grace
Repayment method Equal installments Craduated
/a KHB's lending rate was 10.0% from June 1982 to January 1984 and 10.4%
until November 1984.
Source: KHB, data provided to the Bank mission, 1984.
Problem Areas in Operations
4.21 The NHF has been unable to lend all funds raised in recent years
due, in part, to the failure of the public delivery system to supply an
adequate quantity of units eligible for NHF funding. For example, in 1983 no
NHF-financed units were constructed by KNHC in Seoul, the most important hous-
ing market in Korea. One of the most serious constraints has been that the
scale of operation of large public developers such as KNHC means that the
minimum plot of land required for a project is difficult to find. Given the
growing demand for housing services and financing, as evidenced by the high
level CF participation in contractual savings schemes at NHF, ways to
stimulate the supply of smaller houses need to be sought.
Table 4.6: NATIONAL HOUSING FUND AND KOREA HOUSING BANK:
LOANS BY PURPOSE IN 1983
Ave. Single dwellings Rav house Apartmnts
size Ave. Ave. Ave.
Purpose No. 2 (py) No. 2 size No. size No. 2 *lze
National Housing Fund (NHF)
Agricultural house remodeling 5,000 6.1 n.a. - - - - - - - - -
Rental housing 4,804 5.9 15.9 - - - 547 - 14.6 4,257 - 16.1
Sale housing 52,079 64.1 16.2 2,511 - 20.6 2,131 - 18.0 47,437 - 15.9
Associations/unions housing 18,995 23.4 18.1 420 - 22.0 7,816 - 18.2 10,759 - 17.8
Flood disaster, veterans, bereaved 387 0.5 19.2 234 - 21.9 47 - 15.1 106 - 14.9
families, etc.
Total F1,265 100.0 16.6 3,165 4.2 20.9 10,541 13.8 17.9 62,559 82.0 16.2
Korea Housing Bank (KHB)
Construction for sale 15,515 20.1 18.3 53 - 20.0 1,611 - 16.9 13,851 - 18.5
Purchase of sale house 29,874 38.8 17.8 899 - 21.5 14,673 - 16.4 14,302 - 19.1
Company housing 70 0.1 19.4 - - - 30 - 20.0 40 - 19.0
Construction of employees' housing 1,271 1.7 20.5 - - - - - 1,271 - 20.5
Associations/unions housing 604 0.8 19.2 21 - 23.0 181 - 18.8 402 - 19.2
Individual construction 5,863 7.6 26.0 5,607 - 26.2 256 - 21.5 - - -
Individual purchase 23,722 30.8 19.3 5,437 - 22.8 11,313 - 17.3 6,972 - 20.0
Housing remodeling 18 - 19.9 17 - 19.8 1 - 21.0 - - -
Site purchase 59 0.1 - 59 - - - - - - - -
Total 76,996 100.0 19.1 12,093 15.7 24.2 28,065 36.5 16.9 36,838 47.8 19.1
NHF/KHB 1.06 - 0.87 0.26 - 0.86 0.38 - 1.06 1.70 - 0.85
Source: KHB, Statistics Yearbook of Ban.ing Services, 1983.
Table 4.7: NATIONAL HOUSING FUND AND KOREA HOUSING BANK:
LOANS BY RECIPIP'IT IN 1983
Amount % of total
Recipient No. (W) loan amount Purpose
National Housing Fund (NHF)
Local governments 34,328 202,096 40.3 Associations, sale & rental housing
Korea National Housing Corp. 35,582 250,688 50.1 Sale and rental housing
Agricultural/cooperative unions 5,000 10,560 2.1 Agricultural housing remodeling
Contractors 6,355 37,428 7.5 Sale and rental housing
Total 81,265 500,772 100.0
Korea Housing Bank (KHB)
Contractors 15,865 109,826 :3.2 Construction and site development
Firms and companies 991 4,220 0.9 Company & employee housing
Associations 146 735 0.1 Association housing
Individuals 59,994 359,310 75.8 House purchase, construction,
association remodeling and site
purchase
Total 769996 4749091 100.0
Source: KHB, Statistics Yearbook of Banking Services, 1983.
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4.22 ADother issue for NHF is its large contribution to the consolidated
budget deficit (CBD) of the Government, since its separation from KHB required
it to be accounted for in the Government's overall budget. As a result of
this concern, questions have been raised by the Government as to whether it
should continue to maintain the NHF as a Government fund account. The problem
exists not because NHF is operating at a loss, but because a significant
portion of the funds for new housing loans are appropriately obtained as
borrowings by the Government, since net new lending cannot be wholly financed
by NUH's current revenues. All borrowings act to create a deficit for the
Government on the overall account. This issue should be viewed primarily as
an accounting problem and should not be the basis for determining whether NHF
should exist separately from KHB. The issue, rather, needs to be resolved by
determining what the role of the Government should be in the provision of
housing and housing finance.
4.23 Although NHF was given a different mandate and strong resource
mobilization instruments, its program has mirrored that of KHB. Instead of
focusing on those who would not otherwise be able to acquire a house from com-
mercial sources, NH? has followed policies which make its impact on the
housing sector indistinguishable from the "market" institutions. The specific
policies which have limited NHF's ability to differentiate its program from
that of KHB are, among others, NHF's program of concentrating on first-time
buyers of new units, of using size of unit as a proxy for income and of per-
mittinag lendLkb .;:y through public sector suppliers of housing. Because the
Goverment has not given clear instructions on to how to translate social
pol-cy objectives for NHF, the institution has spread its resources thinly
over many borrowers which makes it more difficult to address the lowest-income
groups. A more clearly targeted role for NHF is required in order to permit
the Government to reach families which truly need public housing and financing
assistance.
C. Citizens National Bank (CNB)
4.24 The CNB was created in 1962 by the Citizens National Bank Act as a
broad-based financial institution serving the needs of households and small
businesses. Although CNB is a state-run bank, it has the form of a joint-
stock corDorAtion end it i nvqq.1iil^ Ph; O, he, -rf - ^'. lb
ralization, the Government might in future years sell back its 65X share of
CNB stock to the public. The clientele served by CNB consists of the general
public and small-scale industries not generally served by commercial banks.
In terms of assets, CNB is 25% larger than KHB. Its sources and uses of funds
in 1983 are illustrated in Table 4.8. Household loans represented 30X of
total assets in 1983, but housing-related loans are only a small part of CNB's
total portfolio. By the end of 1984, CNB was expected to have made W 23 bil-
lion of new housing loans and to have an outstanding portfolio of W 276 bil-
lion or less than 1% of total assets. Lending is directly related to contrac-
tual savings arrangements (mutual savings deposits represented about 77% of
deposits in 1983). The nature of the loans made depends on the type of
contracts. Eligibility and terms of loans made under the WAFD Scheme are
regulated and identical to those offered by KHB. The housing loans made by
CNB in other cases differ from those made by KHB in two important ways: they
can be used for the purchase of houses more than five years old and their
maturities are very short at less than five years.
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Table 4.8: CNB SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS, 1983
(W min, Z)
Sources Uses
Type Amount Composition Type Amount Composition





Loan-linked 410,489 23.2 Loans 902,451 51.0
deposits
Collection
of Loans 732,310 41.4 Others 232,540 13.2
Others 119,799 6.8
Total 1,768,200 100.0 Total 1,768,200 100.0
Source: CNB, Annual Report, 1983
4.25 In an environment of financial liberalization and increased market
competition, CNB is likely to be KHB's most direct competitor for household
savings. CNB has been very active in recent years in developing new consumer
banking products such as credit cards. Given its diversified activities, CNB
is moving steadily in the direction of universal banking. Its banking experi-
ence with households and small-scale loans means that CNB's active presence in
housing finance would depend mostly on the pricing policies followed for
mortgage lending. A continuation of low rates for housing would probably
discourage CNB from expanding its housing finance activities on a significant
scale.
D. National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)
4.26 The NACF operates as a deposit-taking institution and makes mortgage
loans to its members who live mainly in rural areas. Its annual lending is
about W 30 billion and its outstanding loans currently represent about 9% of
the market. However, its role in the housing sector is expected to remain
relatively small in absolute amount and to decline in relative importance,
since the housing shortage in rural areas is considerably less than in urban
areas and is found mostly in peri-urban areas. There is currently a
quantitative balance between households and the number of units in the rural
sec.r. While the quality of housing has improved over the past ten years in
rural areas, it is still a problem and one can expect that the demand for
housing finance in rural areas will be more for short-term improvement loans
than for long-term mortgage loans. In addition, rural residents have
traditionally been reluctant to borrow on a long-term basis for their housing




4.27 Due to the nature of their business, life insurance companies are an
important source of long-term capital which matches the needs of the housing
sector. There were six life insurance companies in Korea with total assets of
W 4,883 billion at the end of 1984. Their role in housing financing has so
far been very small and they have supplied less than 2Z of outstanding housing
mortgages as of end-1984. Their housing loans are extended to policyholders
who intend to build or purchase housing that is less than five years old.
Loans are made for maturities of 10 years or less and carry interest rates
related to prevailing interest rate levels which are higher than KHB rates.
Loan-to-value ratios are based on maximum monthly payments. Two types of
loans are offered: ordinary amortizing loans with equal monthly payments, and
monthly interest payments plus payments of 10% of the principal amount at the
end of each year. To qualify, a borrower must have had a policy for at least
five years.
4.28 By regulation, Korean life insurance companies cannot have more than
15% of their total assets in real estate. In the absence of appropriate
mortgage-related securities, the life insurance companies have been investing
directly in commercial real estate, and they are heavily invested in that
sector. Their real estate holdings incrcer_ by 355% between 1980 and 1984,
while their investments in securities and bond% increased by only 10OX. The
book value of their real estate portfolio is about W 625 billion. Under the
Commercial Code they are expected to revalue their assets every five years,
and it is estimated that these real estate assets will exceed W 1 trillion in
1985, bringing the real estate share to 20X of the total asset portfolio -
vell above regulated levels. Investment strategies have varied significanLIw
aœong companies and the overall ratio before revaluation was 12.8% at the end
of 1984. By comparison, the ratio of real estate holdings to assets of life
insurance companies was 3.5% in the U.S., 6% in Japan and 9.2% in Germany. In
France, insurance companies, which were nationalized after World War II, are
expected to invest 30% of their portfolio in housing, and they own a
substantial amount of rental housing stock.
4.29 In the immediate future, Korean life insurance companies are not
likely to be very active in financing residential housing given their already
large commercial real estate assets, but changing regulatory guidelines could
improve their activities in the rental market. Beyond direct investment in
housing, life insurance companies cannot be active in the sector in the
absence of mortgage-related securities that would be sufficiently liquid and
which would meet the fiduciary responsibilities of life insurance companies.
However, in the longer term, life insurance companies have a legitimate role
to play in increasing the depth of the housing finance market. The Korean
insurance industry has experienced a remarkable growth during the last two
decades and can be expected to continue to do so in the future.
F. Retirement Funds
4.30 Like life insurance companies, retirement funds are generating long-
term capital which could finance long-term mortgages. However, until now
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their role in the housing market has been extremely small. Until 1980 only a
few of them were active in housing. In 1981, with the establishment of the
NHF, several of the funds (Teachers' Pension Fund, Public Officials' Pension
Fund and the Military Personnel Pension Fund) were financing housing in two
ways. First, they provided a portion of their investment funds to NHF to be
on-lent for new housing purposes. Second, they were lending directly to their
members. Prior to 1972, some of the older funds had also assisted their
members by financing the construction of a small number of low-income units
(about 1,600) which were sold at cost. The eligibility conditions restricted
use of funds to members with a minimum of 20 years of service. Since then the
funds have been invested in rental housing stock to promote the welfare of
low-income officials.
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PART TWO: TOWARD A MORE EFFICIENT HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
V. REFORM OF HOUSING POLICY
A. Increasing Housing Supply
5.01 An effective reform of the housing finance system, based on an
increasing role for market forces, should be supported by appropriate changes
in housing policy. Although there is severe crowding and a shortage of units
from the past, the output of new housing has failed to keep pace with even the
new households, let alone make any progress in reducing the backlog. At
present, there are about two million fewer dwellings than households, and new
household formation is averaging about 300,000 per year compared with new
construction of about 200,000 units per year. To keep up with new household
formation and to eliminate the existing shortage, even by the end of this
century, would require an annual production of more than 400,000 units, twice
the present level. Both private and public sector developers have fallen
short of the targets set in the Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social
Development Plan (1982-86) as shown in Table 5.1. Thus, the most immediate
and important challenge facing the Korean Government in the housing sector is
to put in place policies which will stimulate the output of units for sale and
for rent which are appropriate for a broad range of income groups.
Table 5.1: ACHIEVEMENT OF FIFTH PLAN TARGETS IN
HOUSING PRODUCTION (1982-86)
(thousands of housing units)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Plan
Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Total
Public sector 100 68 110 82 110 114 120 132 130 570
Private sector 170 123 170 144 180 108 180 95 190 890
Total 270 191 280 226 290 222 300 227 320 1,460
Source: HOC.
5.02 It is striking that, despite plans to the contrary, the public sec-
tor has exceeded the output of the private sector in three of the last five
years. Table 5.1 shows that the deviation from the :'lan is largely due to a
rather large shortfall in private production and not co an increase in public
output. This divergent performance is the result of demand as well as supply
factors and raises basic questions concerning the inability of the private
sector to increase housing production and the efficacy of present housing
policies in promoting better housing conditions. On the demand side, the
shortage of long-term mortgage finance is a significant factor in restraining
buyers, particularly those of privately developed units, where only about 50%
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of new units received a formal mortgage in 1984. This report suggests that
the expansion of the housing finance system would strengthen effective demand
among a broad range of income groups. Supply bottlenecks occur because of the
shortage of serviced land for housing, taxation policies, and price control
regulations, qamong other things. Given the decline of the private sector
share in housin production, it would be appropriate for the Government to
review those policies and programs which may be restraining private sector
output.
5.03 The policy of directly controlling the selling prices of new
privately developed apartments below known market levels served, in the period
before the bond-bidding system, to create a windfall for the first
purchaser. However, because it has undoubtedly reduced the output of new
units, the longer-term equilibrium prices in dhe housing market may be higher
as a result of this policy. The introduction of the Type II Housing Bonds to
absorb a part of the gap between controlled and market prices was a positive
step which can now be followed by abolition of the controls, without any
adverse effect on buyers, since they are already paying market prices under
the bond-bidding system, and with a positive effect on the supply of new
dwellings (para. 2.29).
5.04 The sales pricing policy of units produced by public sector
developers which establishes sales prices independent of market values pre-
vailing in local markets should be reviewed. More flexibility should be given
to public developers, primarily KNHC, to respond to varying conditions in
local markets. A review of the pricing formulas should consider the windfalls
on resales gained by first purchasers of new public units and whether this is
an appropriate method to transfer subsidies to home buyers (para. 2.28).
B. Policy Directions
5.05 In erder for specific recommendations to be successfully implemen-
ted, it is first necessary that policymakers clarify the role of the Govern-
ment in the housing sector in general and in the housing finance system in
particular. The key issue is the need to distinguish between social welfare
goals and economic efficiency objectives in housing. The primary objective of
public policy should be to encourage a responsive market to serve the majority
of Korean households on a competitive basis. A second objective should be to
consider to what extent housing policy should be utilized to pursue income
redistribution and social policy objectives. To illustrate possible responses
to these two objectives, the following four-part typology, focusing on the
financial ability of households to participate in the housing market, could 1
considered:
Group A (75th + percentile) 231 includes the highest income house-
holds who are able to own with minimal resort to formal borrowing.
This group is able to satisfy its housing desires largely on a
23/ These income groupings are intended to be illustrative and not
definitive.
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"cash" basis with little term financing. Access to housing for this
group is more a function of wealth than income because little or no
formal financing is used.
Group B (50th - 75th percentile) includes households who are able to
purchase housing but require, and can afford, market terms for long-
term financing. This group would be the core clientele for the
market-based housing finance system, along with some buyers from
Group C who have more savings, want larger units or are unwilling to
wait for Gove.rnent-assisted financing. Although this group faces
high housing prices and a bias in the output of new units toward
larger sizes, they do have the income to make substantial monthly
payments under the present system, bu- not necessarily the wealth
for the large down payments required at present. Many nouseholds in
this category may now be renters because they cannot obtain
financing.
Group C (25th - 50th percentile) includes, at the lower end, hou3e-
holds who will need some concessional financing to purchase even the
smallest unit, and households, near the upper end, who can afford
and will opt for the larger more readily available loans from the
market system. This group corresponds to the target group proposed
for NHF financing.
Group D (0 to 25th) includes households who are able to rent
adequate housing without assistance and some who cannot afford even
to rent socially defined "adequate" housing.
5.06 Housing policy and, in particular, its financing aspects should be
differentiated to respond to the varying needs of these different income
groups. Policies that focus on improving the efficiency of the housing
finance system should be designed to address the housing requirements of
Groups B, C and D, both directly, through reform of the quantity and terms of
housing loans which improve access to home ownership, and indirectly, through
improvements in the financing of rental accommodations which should help to
increase the supply. Since Group A is already the best housed in Korea and
has shown itself to be largely able to satisfy its housing needs witrhout
formal borrowing, it should not be a serious problem if some temporary
restrictions, such as a maximum loan or dwelling size, had the effect of
excluding this group from the housing finance system as long as there is a
scarcity of resources. For Group D, which cannot reasonably expect to become
home owners, housing policy should define the type of assistance (income
supplements, food programs, rental vouchers, etc.) to most equitably assist
this group; however, improving access to home ownership is not appropriate for
this group.
5.07 Housing policy should clearly differentiate the role of public
sector agencies (primarily KNHC and NHF) from their private sector counter-
parts. In determining specific activites and practices of public agencies, a
distinction should be made between economic efficiency goals and distribu-
tional objectives. An explicit identification of the benefits and costs of
the public agencies in the housing sector should be attempted.
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5.08 The content of housing policy should be broadened to promote the
financing of all activities in the housing sector and not simply howe owner-
ship for first-time buyers. As long as a quantitative balance between housing
units and households has not been reached, the Government should encourage
home improvement arnd expansion over demolition through its housing finance
institutions by providing more loans for these purposes. In addition, lending
for older, existing units should be permitted because it would increase the
number of smaller, more affordable units available to lower-income households.
Credit and investment incentives should be expanded to promote the construc-
tion of rental housing by the private sector. Public construction and owner-
ship of rental housing should be discouraged, since the financial and manage-
ment problems associated with such programs elsewhere have been serious.
Moreover, the volume of public rental housing is likely to be too small to
make any significant difference in the overall market and may ultimately lead
to large public expenditures.
VI. STRENGTHENING OF THE MARKET-BASED HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
A. A Segregated vs. An Integrated Housing Finance System
6.01 The present housing finance system was put in place in 1967, based
an specialized institutions, to serve a much smaller housing market. Given
the present size and scope of the housing market, a system which can
efficiently intermediate between savers and those deserving loans to purchase
houses is now needed. There are two basic questions which must be answered to
determine the nature of the future housing finance system in a progressively
more liberalized financial sector. The first concerns the degree of
insulation between housing finance and the rest of the financial system, and
the second is related to the extent to which the system will be deregulated to
encourage additional non-specialized lenders and new instruments. At one
extreme of the segregation-integration continuum, there could be a specialized
housing finance system effectively insulated from the capital markets. This
would imply continued regulation of housing finance institutions to ensure
that they have access to low-cost funds which they can, in turn, relend to
prospective homeowners at relatively low cost. This would also mean that the
housing finance system would face a chronic shortage of funds, since the
demand for housing finance at the regulated price would exceed the supply.
Non-price rationing devices, such a m'iltiple eligibility criteria and low
loan-to-value ratios would remain necessary. Moreover, since the existi.Ag
institutions within the industry would be shielded from econom..c competition,
they would not have any particular incentive to become more efficient or
effective and, more importantly, innovative.
6.02 A fully segregated housing finance system may be workable in a
period of macroeconomic stability with low and stable inflation and interest
rates. To the borrower, the cost is much greater than the interest he pays on
a formal mortgage loan, if he is fortunate enough to get one, because
additional funds have to be raised, at even higher costs, to supplement what
will normally be a relatively small mortgage. The housing finance institu-
tions, being effectively insulated from competition, may be tempted to become
comfortable and incur inefficiency costs. Ensuring the perpetuation of such
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an insulated system usually calls for a large regulatory infrastructure,
constant Government intervention and direct Government assistance in periods
of instability.
6.03 The other extreme of this continuum of strategies is the complete
integration of housing finance into the financial and capital markets. This
usually entails a rise in the interest rates for mortgages to levels paid by
other potential users, in order to provide the amount of resources that
borrowers demand and which suppliers would be willing to provide
voluntarily. It involves greater competition among suppliers, and usually
leads to more innovation as lenders look for instrum:rt.s more responsive to
the market place. To the borrower, it means that he can normally have as much
mortgage credit as he wants, provided he is willing to pay the price and
suppliers are willing to take the risks of lending to him. On the supply
side, there are likely to be more players and many more instruments, packaged
differently and priced accordingly, usually with reductions in the costs of
providing services and with less direct intervention from the Government.
6.04 The second issue of whether institutions should be specialized is a
different matter from the integration question, but in practice almost all
segregated systems have fully specialized lenders. If the choice is made to
gradually integrate housing finance with the rest of the financial system,
which is the basis for many of this report's recommendations, then both
specialized and universal-banking type institutions could be making -rtgage
loans in the future.
B. Interest Rate Policies
6.05 The central housing finance issue today is the pricing of financial
services, i.e., how to set interest rates for mobilizing resources and for
mortgage lending. Such issues must be resolved within the context of interest
rate policies for the total financial system, which are undergoing a process
of gradual liberalization and easing of government regulation. For housing
finance, the primary impact will be on the KHB, which is expected to continue
to be the principal housing finance institution over the foreseeable future.
Thus, interest rate policies will be the key to ensuring adequate mobilization
of resources for the housing sector, efficient allocation of the resources
raised, and to RHB remaining a sound financial institution operating without
government subsidies.
6.06 There is substantial evidence that mortgage rates have been too low
in Korea. As noted earlier, the housing finance system is not raising
deposits in sufficient quantity to meet loan demand, because deposit rates
have not been high enough. There is little opportunicy to raise deposit rates
further without increasing mortgage rates, since XHB's spread is already very
small. In addition, the system of administere'i nterest rates for the entire
financial system still produces a term structure of interest rates for
lending, which neither differentiates between conmmercial oan maturities of
two years and mortgage maturities of twenty years, nor takes risk and
collateral considerations into account in loan pricing. Furthermore, in more
developed and fully integrated financial markets, such as the U.S., U.K. and
Denmark, the interest rate on mortgage loans is typically marginally higher
- 56 -
than the cost of long-term corporate bonads reflecting the higher costs of
denomination intermediation and credit information for residential mortgages.
The present Korean situation of lover interest rates on mortgages than on
corporate bonds may reflect the relatively small size of the corporate bond
market and the weak debt picture of many corporations. As financial sector
liberalization proceeds, it would be normal to expect residential mortgage
bonds to be priced near the top of the interest rate structure (see Figure
6.1). Moreover, countries with competitive and integrated financial markets
and flexible interest rates do not suffer from shortages of mortgage funds
such as have occurred in Korea in the past.
6.07 To ensure the viability of the housing finance institutions,
interest rates in the housing sector should be gradually deregulated along
with further liberalization of the financial system to bring them to market
levels, and this deregulation should proceed simultaneously for both deposit
and mortgage rates to ensure an appropriate spread for KHB and other market
lenders of housing finance. One of the ambiguities of the current
liberalization is that KHB has been treated on the liability side like all
other deposit banks, which have been permitted to raise deposit rates more in
line with market levels, while on the lending side KHB is considerably more
restricted both in its choice of assets and on the pricing of its mortgages.
T3 illustrate, KHB must pay the new deposit rate of 12% for six months or
more, which has been permitted since April 1985 for first-tier institutions,
in order to compete with other banks for deposits, but KHB mortgage rates have
been fixed at a maximum of 11.5%. Although KHB reises other deposit funds at
lower costs through contractual savings schemes and other sources so that it
can operate in this situation with a positive spread (albeit low), lending
rates at less than the cost of funds will seriously jeopardize the financial
viability of KHB in the future. During this transitional period of financial
liberalization, it is recommended that within the regulated band for lending
(currently 10.0% - 13.5%), KHB be permitted to price its mortgages up to the
maximum rate (i.e. 13.5% at present) to reflect the longer-term and riskier
nature of its types of loans and to ensure an adequate spread on its opera-
tions. To further increase the effective yield on its mortgage instruments,
or to price some new types of mortgages higher, during the period of regulated
interest rates, KHB could charge the home buyers service fees to cover l6an
origination costs.
6.08 Regarding KHB's outstanding mortgage portfolio for which the
contracts permit a variable interest rate, the interest rate on mortgage
contracts should be adillsted both upward and downward over their life. If
interest rate liberalipation brings higher interest rates, KHB can avoid
exposure to major interest rate risk by adjusting interest rates on mortgage
contracts upward. The 1984 adjustment of mortgage interest rates on outstand-
ing contracts from 10% to 11.5%, which is the first time that a known adjust-
ment has occurred in an upward direction, is a step in the right direction and
should continue if interest rates on new mortgages rise further.
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6.09 The impact of allowing formal mortgage rates to increase, when
combined with larger loans from an expanded system, may even reduce the home
buyers sactual total cost of financing housing, since there would be less
reliance on higher cost informal sources of funds. The results of assumed
higher mortgage rates and larger loans to home buyers are presented in
Table 6.1 and are compared with typical financing terms under the present
system. The cost of financing a home purchase is shown as a monthly payment
factor, expressed as a percentage of the house price. Five typical borrowers
under the present system and seven hypothetical borrowers under the proposed
system are included. In each example, the purchase is financed with a combi-
nation of loans and "own resources." The loans classified as "fonral" under
the present system are priced at the prevailing rate for KHB of 11.5Z p.a. for
20 years, and "informal" rates are priced at the curb ma-ket rate of 22Z and
assumed to be amortized in six years. The remaining portion of the purchase
price, "own resources", which may be savings or sale of an asset, is assumed
to have no financial cost. These own resources are estimated to make up 30%,
40% and 50X of the total housing price in the various scenarios. Under the
proposed system, scenarios of interest rates ranging from 15-20% p.a. are
assumed, along with the higher loan-to-value ratios.
6.10 The analysis in Table 6.1 indicates that the direct monthly
financial cost for borrowers who match the financing profile described would
decrease under the proposed system. Comparing borrowers with the same level
of down payment, present "A" would be better off choosing either "F" or "G"
under the new system. "B", with savings of 40%, could move to "H" and reduce
costs. Similarly "C" could adopt "I" or "J" and "D" could adopt "I" under the
proposed system to improve their position. "C" would not find it advantageous
to move to "iK", but the 20% interest rate used to compute example "K" repre-
sents the most pessimistic assumption. "L" illustrates the power of longer
maturities, where even borrowing 70% of the value of a unit at 20% interest is
better than taking a present KHB loan and raising an equal amount on the curb
market ("A"). These examples illustrate that the present system of very small
loans, even when combined with substantial savings with no financial cost,
leave the cost of purchasing a house high in almost all cases compared to
scenarios where larger loans are provided at higher interest rates because of
the reduced reliance on high-cost, informal sources of funds.
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Table 6.1 COST OF FINANCINC A HOUSING UNIT UNDER ALTERNATIVE
ASSUMPTIONS OF HOUSINC FINANCE PROVIDED
Formal Loans Informal Loans Monthly
(for 20 years) (for 6 years) Saving cost (Z of
(share) (rate) (share) (rate) (share) (rate) unit price)
Present System
A 35.0 11.5 35.0 22.0 30.0 0.0 1.25
B 35.0 11.5 25.0 22.0 40.0 0.0 1.00
C 35.0 11.5 15.0 22.0 50.0 0.0 0.75
D 40.0 11.5 10.0 22.0 50.0 0.0 0.68
E 50.0 11.5 20.0 22.0 30.0 0.0 1.03
Proposed System
F 50.0 15.0 20.0 22.0 30.0 0.0 1.16
G 60.0 17.0 10.0 22.0 30.0 0.0 1.13
H 60.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.88
I 50.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.66
J 50.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.73
K 50.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.85
L 70.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 1.19
Note: Share is expressed as a percent of the housing unit price.
Rate is interest rate per annum.
6.11 The present practice of adjusting deposit rates should be continued
so that KHB's spreads are not eroded in a situation of declining interest
rates. More compet;.Eion for deposits under financial liberalization will
require greater flexibility for KHB in setting deposit rates by maturity in
order to attract an adequate level of savings for housing finance. The appli-
cation of the recent maturity-differentiated deposit rates on KHB accounts is
appropriate, and as financial liberalization proceeds, KHB should be given
maximum flexibility in setting deposit interest rates to help it attract a
sufficient quantity of household funds.
C. Market Mortgage Instruments
6.12 KHB's effectiveness ir the housing sector can be incre4sed by
improving its lending instruments, primarily by offering borrowers more
options in various combinations according to needs, including:
(a) higher loan-to-value ratios;
(b) shorter maturities;
(c) loans for any age of dwelling;
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(d) more loans for renovation and expansion of existing houses; and
(e) use of graduated payment mortgages.
KHB should differentiate the prices of mortgages according to the various
options provided and default risks associated with each type of loan.
6.13 The provision of larger housing loans will be dependent upon a
greater quantity of funds available for the housing finance system, implying
that loan-to-value ratios should be raised gradually in line with the overall
growth of the housing finance system. Establishing a schedule of loan-to-
value ratios will eliminate the need for the current system of different fixed
absolute loan ceilings by house size.
6.14 Varying the maturities of loans from the rpresent single 20-year
instrument could have several advantages. Shorter maturities could be attrac-
tive for the households which have been borrowing from KHB without experienc-
ing payments-to-income constraints. Such borrowers might not want to face
long maturities given the new environment of price stability and the high real
interest rates carried by mortgage loans. An additional reason for experimen-
ting with different maturities is that the absence of interest deductions from
income taxes in Korea may mean that borrowers do not favor long maturities
with up-front loading of interest repayments. Finally, somewhat shorter
maturities facilitate the recycling of funds in the sector and raise the level
of internal resource generation for housing finance institutions.
6.15 The other changes proposed will also increase KHB's responsiveness
to borrowers. An important innovation, which can be adopted in the short run,
is to eliminate the present restrictions on the age of the dwelling and simply
make loans on the basis of a satisfactory appraisal which determines the
market value of the house. Encouraging people to expand and renovate are
efficient ways of improving housing conditions and should be supported by KHB
with larger lending programs. Gradua:e- payusent mortgages may also be popular
and can be safe for KHB as long as the starting rates fully cover interest
charges. For KHB there is no reason to favor first-time buyers in terms of
maximizing the effect of the financing system on housing output. A rule of
holding only one KHB mortgage at a time may be retained as a rationing device
as long as there is a shortage of mortgage funds to lend.
6.16 The adjustable rate mortgage contracts which KHB offers should
continue to be provided for new customers, and in order to permit smooth
implementation of the adjustments, several explicit features could be
incorporated in the contracts. For one, the mortgage contracts could identify
the basis for adjustment which, under present regulations, might be linked to
the cost of funds and administered interest rates. The KHB may also wish to
study whether the acceptability of fully and quickly adjusting mortgages could
be increased by introducing a provision to the contracts which limits the
maximum rate of interest adjustment or the speed by which the interest rate
could be adjusted over a particular period of time by establishing "caps". In
certain cases, when an increased interest rate would cause hardship to
customers, it should be possible to keep monthly payments at the same level
and extend the term for repayment.
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D. Size of the Housing Finance System
6.17 Estimating the future demand for mortgages or the size of the formal
housing finance system is not an easy task in view of the fundamental changes
taking place in the financial sector. The demand for housing finance will
depend both upon new housing and transactions in existing units. Policy
questions which have not been resoLved, such as the extent to which housing
finance will be integrated within the overall financial sector, and technical
details of how much each borrower will be loaned, all will have a major impact
on the size of the system. This section forecasts upper and lower limits for
the system and suggests how the proposed reforms will influence the future
volume of mortgage lending in Korea.
6.18 In 1983 and 1984, the formal housing finance system provided loans
for about 75% of the new units sold with an average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
of 30% for a total volume of annual new lending equivalent to about 22.5% of
the value of all new units. Table 6.2 shows the results of an exercise which
forecasts the future size of the formal housing finance system and of KHB.
The minimum growth scenario, A, assumes no increase in the share of units
receiving mortgages (75Z), or the average LTV (30%). However, the real value
of new output is assumed to grow at 5.0% p.a. and the number of units produced
at 3.5% p.a. Lending from NHF is held constant in all scenarios, and KHB's
lending is forecast to fill the gap. In scenario A, the formal system grows
1.5 times over the next five years and KHB 2.1 times, neither very ambitious
targets. If the average loan were to increase to 35% of the value of the
unit, scenario B, KHB would grow to 2.6 times its present value and the
overall system to 1.7 times. If loans increased to cover 50% of the value of
houses purchased, as recommended in this report, KHB's size would grow by a
multiple of 4.3 and the entire formal mortgage system by 2.4 times. If the
assets of the entire financial system continue to increase as they did from
1975 to 1984 (see Table 3.1), this would still leave housing finance with a
modest share of about 6Z and KHB with about 4%. Changes in the average value
of units or the growth of ne-w output could affect the tetal demand for
mortgages, but the provision of loans to three-quarters of new construction
could also be adjusted downward to accommodate a rise in other factors. This
calculation does not include any financing for the sale of existing units.
However, the small present size of the housing finance system and the
projections of growth in the total formal financing system over the next five
years leave room for exploring such new types of lending without threatening
serious disruption to the financial sector.
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Table 6.2: ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
TAnnual volume, billion won, 1984 price.)
Actual 1983184 Projections for 1989
(2-year average) A B C
(LTV=30Z) (LTV=35%) (LTV-50S)
All formal lending for housing 1,044 1,528 1,782 2,546
: of which KHB lending (410) (842) (1,069) (1,752)
Informal finance and equity 3,434 5,262 5,008 4,244
Investment in new units 4,478 6,790 6,790 6,790
6.19 The upper and lower bounds for mortgage demand suggested above
should be viewed as orders of magnitude as to how the system may expand. The
KHB's Survey of Borrowers asked buyers about their financing strategy, and the
analysis did not suggest an explosive demand. Greater demand might occur if
mortgages were priced considerably below the market or if real rates of appre-
ciation on real estate were extremely high, but neither of these conditions is
likely to prevail under the current economic management policies in Korea.
The reforms proposed for the housing finance system are likely to make any
direct control of its size unnecessary. If additional resources are raised at
market-determined interest rates, any higher cost would have to be passed on
to the borrowers, thus automatically restraining demand.
E. Future Sources of Funds for an Expanded Housing Finance System
6.20 The expected increase in demand for housing, combined with new uses
and larger sizes of housing loanb, will require a greater quaatity of
resources. The avenues for funds mobilization will be largely a function of
the extent to which KHB, as the primary market housing finance institution,
will be permitted to compete with other deposit-taking financial institutions
for household deposits, which should remain the principal source of funds for
market housing finance. The further development of the financial system
towards market pricing is expected to channel informal sources of funds
through the formal institutions. KHB should be in a strong position to
attract a reasonable share of these savings assuming that it is permitted to
pay prevailing market prices for deposits.
6.21 During the transitional period toward financial liberalization, KHB
can continue to use the incentives offered in its contractual savings schemes
to mobilize resources for the sector. These savings schemes, which link the
eligibility for a loan to the prospective borrower having made deposits over a
period of time, have several appealing features. For one, a record of payment
is established over a reasonably long period of time which gives an indication
of the credit risk of the potential borrower. Contractual savings schemes
also offer a process whereby the participating institutions can improve their
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prediction of the demand for loans in a particular time period. Because
deposits in these schemes receive somewhat less than market interest rates,
the schemes have the ability to generate resources at a relatively low cost.
However, they can create a funding problem for lending institutions because
the contract requires that a loan be made after a certain saving period. The
contract may be difficult to honor for reasons not related to bhe contract
schemes, such as a general shortage of loanable funds or a lack of eligible
houses for mortgage loans, causing savers to withdraw their deposits.
Furthermore, prospective borrowers lock in specific loan amounts at the time
the contract is entered into, although it is not possible to predict housing
costs several years in advance with accuracy, implying there is no assurance
up front that loan amounts will be sufficient to permit house purchases. As
the housing finance system moves toward market pricing, contractual savings
schemes will not remain attractive to savers because there will be no
incentive in terms of a below-market mortgage at the end of the contract.
Therefore, over the longer term this source of funds would be expected to
disappear.
6.22 Under a more market-based financial system, KHB may also wish to
explore the option of floating housing bonds backed by the security of its
mortgages to raise additional funds for housing finance. KHB floated bonds
previously but abandoned this avenue during the mid-seventies because of its
inability to offer competitive yields while maintaining positive spreads with
the assigned mortgage interest rates. By floating mortgage-backed housing
bonds, KHB may be able to tap institutional investors, such as insurance
companies and pension funds which might not otherwise wish to invest directly
in real estate, if it pays market interest rates and can adjust its mortgage
interest rates to maintain a positive spread on operations. The present
policy objective of bringing the financial markets to fully competitive pric-
ing is encouraging the development of long-term capital sources, creating
realistic opportunities for the emergence of a long-term mortgage bond market.
F. Secondary Mortgage Market
6.23 At present, the market for housing finance is served for the most
part by KHB with very limited lending provided by a few other institutions
such as CNB. Over the longer term, it would be highly desirable to facilitate
the entry of a greater variety of long-term investors with their own
diversified financial needs and objectives. This would increase efficiency in
various ways: greater competition, more innovation and greater financial
depth in this particular sector of the market. The development of a secondary
market facility is needed to improve the housing finance system. With the
progressive development of the financial sector, and in particular interest
rate liberalization, a secondary market facility would also play an important
role in addressing the interest rate and liquidity risks faced by investors in
long-term housing loans (including KHB).
6.24 Since the implementation of a secondary market facility could take
several years to prepare and implement, it would be very desirable to initiate
preliminary studies as early s possible. A variety of technical issues are
involved such as: pricing mechanisms and supervision, legal characteristics
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of the underlying guarantees and evaluation of the possible deficiencies of
present mortgage instruments, taxation and accountit.g regulations for partici-
pants, rules for accreditation and access to the secondary market facility.
C. Impact of tne Proposed Changes
6.25 The impact of implementing the recommendations for a market-based
housing finance system would be t. expand the size of the formal housing
finance system, to fund a broader range of investments in housing, and to
target services more effectively to an increasingly differential clientele.
The expanded size of the mortgage finance system will be necessary to
compensate for an expected decline in informal sources, due to financial
sector reform, and will be facilitated by the application of market pricing to
mortgage loans. When the housing finance system offers more flexibility in
the types of loans and an increase in the range of investments eligible for
mortgage financing, the impact of the financing system on the evolution of
housing conditions would be much greater that at present. The availability of
larger loans requiring smaller down payments ond of these new features will
also enable the housing finance system to serve a clientele with a greater
proportion of medium- and lower-income borrowers.
6.26 It is the market-based side of housing finance which is expected to
grow, and KHB will play a leading role. Although expanding both the
instruments and the activities financed at the same time, KHB's management
should be able to maintain the growth and financial viability of the
institution if they are free to take decisions on mobilization and lending in
response to the demand for mortgage finance. A -.ear and unambiguous
responsibility for building an efficient market-based housing finance system
in Korea should be assigned to KHB.
6.27 From the viewpoint of home buyers, there will be an increased
availability of formal household finance, which could even result in a lower
average cost of borrowing for those who previously relied on informal
sources. More flexibility in the types and purposes of loans available would
also mean that more households can improve their housing situations through
the financing system. If, as expected, the chonsei system declines, renters
will also have the opportunity to make better use of their savings and will
have more alternatives in their choice of rental accomodations.
6.28 The proposed changes to the housing finance system are consistent
with the Government's objectives to strengthen the nontraded sectors as a
"second engine of growth" and to bring the benefits of more efficient
financial intermediation to more of the economy by liberalizing the financial
system. These benefits would be primarily realized by more of the financing
for housing flowing through the formal system, rather than through the
informal credit markets, with lower overall intermediation costs in comparison
to a system of transactions among private parties. The current volume of
informal financial claims related to housing suggests an ample opportunity to
channel these resources through the formal system without displacing funds
from other sectors. The demand for mortgage finance will undoubtedly
increase, but the rate of growth will be automatically restrained by the
rising price required to mobilize resources from savers. At the same time,
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improved allocation of savings between sectors and a shift in the household
savings portfolio toward more financial instruments are expected. Expanded
formal financing would also make a reduction in direct Government intervention
in the housing sector possible.
VII. THE FINANCING VJF HOUSING FOR LOWER-INCOME BUYERS
A. A Separate Role for the National Housing Fund (NHF)
7.01 The 1981 separation of NHF from KHB was a positive step in improving
housing finance policies and the operation of the involved public institu-
tions, because it offered the opportunity to make explicit the public roie in
assisting low-income house purchasers. Although reintegration of NHF with KHB
has been considered as a possible response to NHF's effect on the Government
budget deficit, the current arrangement of separate entities should be
maintained over the medium term to permit clear and distinctive objectives to
be assigned to NHF and KHB. While much of the motivation in 1981 was to
segregate the two on the basis of sources of finds, it was also acknowledged
that it would be desirable for each to serve a different clientele. The fund
mobilization side of the separation was successful in making it easier to
direct public funds to NHF. On the lending side very little has changed,
largely because there has never been a comprehensive policy statement on hous-
ing finance acknowledging the dual nature of the Government's responsibil-
ities, whicn include the promotion of social welfare objectives as well as the
encouragement of well-functioning economic markets to supply and allocate
housing services. The NHF's primary role in the medium term should be defined
in terms of providing assistance for house purchases to those households which
the Government wishes to support and who have difficulty affording the market
terms (focussed on Group C). Over the longer term, as the market-based
housing finance system expands, the Government may wish to let the market
share of NHF decline or even phase out its operation.
B. Targetting the Beneficiaries of NHF
7.02 In order to establish a distinct role for NHF, the intended
beneficiaries of NHF should be clearly identified in advance and procedures
should be put in place to see that they are the recipients of NHF assistance.
The present system of screening applicants for public housing by assuming that
the size of a housing unit will determine the income of an interested buyer
may not be an effective way to select lower-income borrowers. In order to
increase NHF's impact on equity, it is suggested that the beneficiaries of NHF
housing loans be families up to the 50th percentile of the urban income
distribution, corresponding approximately to Group C which now consists
primarily of renters. Since income levels are recommended as the determinant
for allocating NHF housing loans, they could be verified for salaried workers
by confirming the income directly with the employer, or for self-employed
workers by requesting a copy of the previous year's tax return.
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C. Sources of Funds for Future Operations
7.03 The most important source of funds for NHF's operations is national
housing bonds. As discussed previously (para. 4.13), Type I housing bonds are
low-yield, compulsory purchase bonds for those engaged mainly in construction
and real estate transactions. In this sense, these bonds are a tax on those
who are benefitting significantly from housing and construction activities
which is used to fund a transfer to the public housing program. Revenues from
the sale of Type I housing bonds should continue to be earmarked as a source
of funds -or NHF's operations. However, because their issuance is highly
dependent on the business cycle and general economic conditions and thus
cannot be expanded further as a source of funds except as these activities
grow, this source of revenue is not expected to be sufficient to fully sustain
the operations of NHF in the future.
7.04 If price controls on privately-built apartments are discontinued
because of their negative effect on housing supply, Type II housing bonds will
no longer serve any useful purpose. The prior rationale for controlling
prices on private apartments was to make them cheaper to buyers, but the in-
troduction of Type II housing bonds has been to move toward market prices from
the purchasers' point of view. In this circumstance, it is doubtful what
benefit comes from controlling prices which private developers can receive,
but it is clear that this has reduced their incentive to construct housing
units in areas subject to these price controls. Even if price controls were
retained on private sector apartments, the quantity of Type II housing bonds
sold is likely to decrease in the future. If the Government keeps prices low
relative to market values on certain private sector apartments, the private
sectof is not likely to supply many units because profits will be squeezed and
thus fewer bonds will be sold. If the Government sets controlled prices
closer to market values, then the number of bonds buyers willing to purchase
would decrease due to the decreased gap between the controlled price and the
market price. Thus, Type II housing bonds are not a sustainable source of
funds for NHF. Since first-time buyers of some privately-built apartments are
now paying almost full market prices under the bond-bidding system, as subse-
quent purchasers always have, it seems likely that the supply expansion bene-
fits of removing price controls will outweigh the use of this instrument for
funding NHF.
7.05 To supplement the Type I housing bonds as a source of funds for NHF,
contractual savings schemes can be continued for NHF's operations, but the
long-term liquidity implications are linked to NHF's ability to mobilize
sufficient resources to meet the contracts when due. NHF is not a deposit-
taking entity and thus, in order to attract depositors, it must require pro-
spective purchasers of houses financed under its programs to participate in a
contractual savings scheme.
7.06 The use of the various national pension funds for the provision of
housing finance by the NHF is in keeping with the broad aim of the funds,
which is to provide long-term financial security to contributors, and housing
is an appropriate form of security and savings. Therefore, if pension fund
rfsources continue to be directed to NHF, the interest rate paid for the use
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of these funds should be not less than that paid by alternative users. In
addition, pension funds should be utilized only when needed, since this is a
higher-cost source of funds for NHF.
D. Terms and Types of Loans
7.07 If NHF continues to rely primarily on public sources of funds with
explicit prices, such as housing bonds, the minimum NHF lending rate should
fully cover the cost of funds and any administrative expenses incurred, so
that NHF can be operated on a sound financial basis without direct Government
transfers. It is possible that this pricing formula would permit NHF
mortgages to be priced lower than regular market loans, thereby providing an
advantage to its lower-income borrowers.
7.08 While the objective of NHF should be to assist lower-income home
buyers, the terms of its loans should not be so attractive that those who can
afford to pay market terms dominate the demand for NHF funds. In addition to
the recommended maximum income target of the 50th percentile of the urban
income distribution, it will be imp-*--t to set eligible house sizes and
loan-to-value ratios at levels that -ill attract mainly lower-income house-
holds. The present eligible house sizv of 25.7 py may have been appropriate
for the more limited housing finance system of the past, but 25.7 py is well
above the average house size of about 20 py for the existing stock of dwell-
ings and not much different from the eligible house size of 30 py for KHB
loans. The maximum eligible house size for UHF loans should therefore be
reduced to the average size of the housing stock, about 20 py, which is
affordable to families at about the 50th percentile of the urban income
distribution. To "taper" the benefits of NHF's programs further, a sliding
scale of loan-to-value ratios, from, say, 50% for the largest eligible house
size to 70-80% for smaller houses, should be introduced to increase NHF s
impact on the lowest-income buyers. By zstablishing loan-to-value ratios, the
current system of specific ceilings for loan amounts by house size will not be
necessary.
7.09 In addition to the above suggestions, the graduated payment feature
(GPM) should be continued but offered as an option to the borrower rather than
as a mandatory feature. There are likely to be buyers who prefer the more
rapid amortization of principal under a conventional level-payment plan. In
addition, the mortgages should continue to be issued as adjustable rate
instruments to help ensure that NHF will be operated on a sound financial
basis. In addition to the 20-year maturity currently offered, UHF may wish to
provide even longer maturities of 25 or 30 years to help improve the
affordability of smaller houses for its lower-income clientele.
7.10 Since NHF's primary goal will be that of assisting lower-income
households to become home owners, it should maximize the options offered to
its clientele. In addition to providing housing finance for newly constructed
units by public sector developers, NHF should provide housing finance to
eligible households for purchase of existing units or for new units of
eligible house size produced by private sector developers. It is likely that
existing small units are less expensive than newly constructed units of
similar characteristics, and thus more affordable to lower-income buyers. For
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NHF, the first-time buyer rule should be retained because it increases the
chances of serving lower-income buyers.
7.11 Since the vast majority of lover-income urban residents in Korea are
renters, the NHF should develop a mechanism to assist the private sector
directly to improve the housing status of lower-income renters. NHF should
experiment with offering long-term financing to private parties for the
construction and operation of eligible size apartments for permanent rental.
These loans should be priced at market interest rates for loans of similar
risk and maturity. As a protective measure, if the rental units are converted
to sale or other uses, NHF could require the borrower to repay the loan in
full at that time. It is expected that NHF could, in addition to its role as
a financing entity, help stimulate the formal rental market in Korea.
E. Impact of the Proposed Changes
7.12 The main changes recommended in this report are directed to
expanding the market-based system of housing finance because most Koreans will
benefit by having access to larger formal housing loans at market prices.
There is, however, an important residual role left to play in assisting those
families who are almost able to afford a house. The impact of the proposed
recommendations is to improve NHF's effectiveness in carrying out the
Government's objectives in this respect.
7.13 NHF will achieve increased impact mainly through changes in its
terms and conditions, making them advantageous compared to market lending. If
the recipienta are better targetted, in the sense that they conform to the
Government's explicit social policy objective, the effectivenss of public
policy will also be enhanced. The terms of NHF lending are recommended to be
set at a level which fully covers the financial cest of the sources from which
they are drawn. However, since prices on the primary mobilization instruments
are not determined in a free market, there can be an advantage to the borrower
which does not require direct budgetary outlays from the Government. The
recommended higher loan-to-value ratios for the smaliest units, while
remaining within the debt-carrying capacity of the household would also have
the effect of maximizing benefit for the lowest-income buyers who presently
have the most difficulty in entering the market.
7.14 Several new or modified restrictions are proposed to increase the
ability of NHF to reach the intended clientele. The income restriction at the
50th percentile should be a maximum level in terms of a direct social program.
The presumably lower interest rates in the future from UHF than from KHB will
be offset by the other restrictions on NHF borrowers and the lowest KHB bor-
rower. The maximum size for an NHF-financed unit is suggested to be set at
the average of the existing stock of houses which is about 20 py at this
time. Along with a maximum house value and the tapered loan-to-value
regulation, these restrictions may exclude some previous NHF borrowers but
will increase the relative benefits to those still eligible. Opening up the
possibility of purchasing an existing unit, or a new privately developed unit
which conforms, will also increase the supply and may even reduce the cost of
housing for the lowest-income groups.
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7.15 Although there is no precise way to establish how large tne NHF
should be, there are some principles which provide guidance. The NHF has not
carried out its business in a way which is differentiated from KHB. The NHF
has been indiscriminately lending to all income levels for housing sizes not
significant'v different from KHB's, in part because it was not offering terms
measurably better than KHB's. The central theme of this study is that a
market-based housing finance system can and should serve most Koreans. The
remaining role for NHF is to provide a limited Level of assistance or to
implicitly subsidize those who are almost able to purchase a home with their
own resources.
7.16 The cumulative effect of the proposals for NHF made in this report
would be to exclude higher-income buyers from purchasing larger size units
with NHF resources because they can afford market rates. While the effect
will be to reduce demand for this facility, some other changes proposed, such
as lending for existing units, and for new privately developed units, higher
loan-to-value ratios for smaller units and rental construction, should all
increase the demand for and the effectiveness of NHF's lending. In accordance
with Korea's objective of financial sector liberalization and because lower-
income households can be served effectively, there is no need to expand the
market share of NHF. In the short run, NHF may remain as large as KHB, but it
will be economically efficient and equitable to encourage the expansion of the
housing finance system on the market side.
